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Expectation And Desire In The Law Of
Forcible Rape
STEVEN B. KATZ*
Inside an unjust, embittering social universe where there are moral
possibilities, however imperiled, of self-esteem and empathy, fuck-
ing is the universal event, the point of connection, where love is
possible if self-knowledge is real; it is also the place where the price
paid, both for ignorance and truth, is devastating, and no lie lessens
or covers up the devastation.'
Nationally, a conservative estimate is that, under current condi-
tions, 20-30 percent of girls now twelve years old will suffer a vio-
lent sexual attack during the remainder of their lives.'
The law of forcible rape is premised on the enforcement of male3
expectations of sex. When a man reasonably expects that sexual ac-
* Member of the California Bar; Law Clerk to the Honorable Irving Hill,
United States District Court for the Central District of California. A.B. 1984, M.A.,
J.D. 1987, University of Southern California; J.S.M. 1988, Stanford University.
I would like to thank Rachel Adler, Sheila Briggs, Ronald Garet, Mark Kelman, Ste-
phen Morse, and Deborah Rhode for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. A. DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 51 (1987).
2. Johnson, On the Prevalence of Rape in the United States, 6 SIGNs 136, 145(1980) (emphasis in original). Cf. Russel & Howell, The Prevalence of Rape in the
United States Revisited, 8 SIGNS 688, 689 (1983) (approximately 46% of adult women
will experience rape or attempted rape in their lives based on survey statistics of women
in San Francisco).
3. Notwithstanding the facts that (1) either sex can be a rapist or rape victim,
and (2) both rape reformers and law reviews have discovered the virtues of gender-neu-
tral language, I will refer to rapists as males, and rape victims as females. Phenomeno-
logically, rape is a male act, and being raped, a female experience. Schafer & Frye,
Rape and Respect, in WOMEN AND VALUES: READINGS IN RECENT FEMINIST PHILOSO-
PHY 188, 189 (M. Pearsall ed. 1986).
cess is forthcoming from a woman, he will not be convicted of rape if
he proceeds to have sex with her, even though she has not consented
to have sex. Whether a given expectation is "reasonable" depends
much less on the cognitive capacities of the man - whether her sub-
jective unwillingness to have sex ought to be apparent to him -
than it does on the arrangements of male desire and female desira-
bility which comprise the social arrangements we call gender. I will
argue not only that the law unjustly presumes (or, constructs)
women's consent, but also, under a system where men are socially
and legally privileged to achieve some of their sexual expectations by
means of self-help, that one cannot fully imagine what consensual
sexuality is. I will not raise a self-satisfied charge of false conscious-
ness against women who experience their sexual lives with men to be
consensual. But under our law of forcible rape I am not sure if I
could comfortably share with these women the conclusion that their
sexual choices are uncoerced.
In Part One of this article I will introduce a contractual model to
explain the social arrangements protected under the law of forcible
rape - a model which allows men to enforce their "reasonable" ex-
pectations of sexual access by means of self-help without regard to
the willingness of his partner.4 Parts Two and Three argue that rape
law doctrine does, in fact, enforce the reasonable expectations of sex-
ual access held by men. Part Two focuses on the construction of the
victim, examining both the marital exemption and evidence issues.5
One can think of it as describing the conditions under which wives
and lovers are rapable. Part Three explores the construction of the
rapist, discussing the relationship between mens rea and force in
terms of the resistance standard, and the mistake-of-fact defense.6
Part Four examines the relationship between the principle of the en-
forcement of expectations and the cognitive capacities of rapists.7
The "weakness" of rapists is that they fail to discipline their sexual
desire to their cognitive capacity to understand the desired woman's
subjective willingness to engage in sex. Part Five concludes by high-
lighting the contradiction between the fact of enforcement and the
liberal ideal of sexual bodily autonomy.8
This article thus ultimately struggles with the following question:
Is genuine sexual choice ever possible where a legally-defined entitle-
ment structure empowers men over women? Here is the tragedy of
the law of forcible rape, and the social relations it defines and sus-
tains. We cannot really be sure.
4. See infra notes 9-22 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 23-114 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 115-70 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 171-219 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 220-30 and accompanying text.
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I. THE CONCEPT OF ENFORCEABLE EXPECTATIONS IN THE LAW
OF RAPE
The characteristic of the law of rape that I will explore in this
article - the male right of self-help to enforce reasonable expecta-
tions of sexual access - does not apply across the entire range of
possible encounters between (predatory) men and (unwilling)
women. The "blitz" rapist - who pulls his victim off the street, or
forces his way into her home - cannot avail himself of this right of
self-help. In no possible sense of the word can any of his expectations
be deemed "reasonable." But a man who is married to a woman, or
who has a sexual relationship with her, and who therefore has rea-
sonable expectations of sexual access (expectations generated chiefly
by the fact that she is with him, or has consented to sex in the past)
may accomplish these expectations regardless of the woman's subjec-
tive willingness to have sex, as long as he does not pick a means of
self-help which vitiates the reasonableness of his expectations (e.g.,
more physical force than necessary to enter her). It is enough for a
reasonable expectation if such a woman does not explicitly and obvi-
ously refuse, or resist, or fight back; she need not affirmatively con-
sent to sex.
This is a "contract" conception of rape law. There is another con-
ception of rape law, a "property" conception, which feminist scholar-
ship traditionally uses to criticize rape laws as a social institution.
Although the argument that rape laws treat women as the property
of men encompasses both conceptions of rape law (and the critiques
they generate), I want to be careful about distinguishing the prop-
erty conception from my contract conception.
The property conception receives its most coherent, and convinc-
ing, explication in the work of Loreen Clark and Debra Lewis.9 They
make a four-step argument for the validity of the property concep-
tion: (1) The need for stable and certain lines through which family
(material) wealth may descend, when combined with the perception
of women as naturally incapable of serving as stewards of society's
primary goods (wealth, power, authority, etc.), leads to a form of
control over the bodies of women which looks very much like the
relationship between owner and property. 10 (2) Rape is seen as a
property crime, which one man (the rapist) commits against another
9. L. CLARK & D. LEWIs, RAPE: THE PRICE OF COERCIVE SEXUALITY (1977).
10. See id. at 112-14. See also S. OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL
THOUGHT (1979).
(the husband/father/owner). Accordingly, the severity or harm of
the crime is in proportion to the value of the property taken. There is
thus great harm in raping "valuable" women (women of the upper
classes, and women of any class who are "owned" adhere to social
conventions which are expressed through the regime of property in
women), and no harm in raping "valueless" women (poor or inde-
pendent). Valueless women can hardly be "raped" at all.1' (3)
Women are enjoined by social convention to adhere to the rules
which make them valuable; to refuse to stick to these rules is tanta-
mount to violation of a trust duty. A woman who is a poor trustee of
her conventional value renders herself valueless, and hence rapable.
Furthermore, when such a woman is raped, her fault - poor trus-
teeship - eclipses the fault of the man who "took" her. 2 (4) Sexu-
ality (including reproductive capacity) is thus virtually the only pri-
mary good which women control. They have to use it in order to
secure their material and emotional well-being in society. The inevi-
table result is that the line between force and consent becomes
blurred, making all sexuality in some sense coercive:
Women's alienation from her own sexuality, man's resentment at having to
purchase sexual fulfillment, the unequal bargaining that trades security for
sex-all of these distortions of human sexuality make it inevitable that
much sexual contact between men and women will necessarily be coercive
in nature. Women must withhold sex from men, and men must pay women
a price for it. The top price is marriage, but women may also exchange
their sexuality for emotional security, social status, minor economic re-
wards, or, more negatively, safety from economic or physical threats. If
men are unable or unwilling to pay the top price, they must bargain women
down. If they still do not have the assets to purchase the sexual property
they want, they must persuade or force women into parting with it. Of
course, even the "best" bargain a woman can make is fundamentally coer-
cive, since it entails an acceptance of herself of property, and is made from
a position of inequality. 3
Although the property and contract conceptions of rape law even-
tually end up at the same place - the problematic distinction be-
tween coercive and consensual sexuality in society - it is important
to separate them. Although the property conception offers an expla-
nation for the specific performance of sexual promises identified
under the contract conception, it both over- and under-explains. It
over-explains specific performance because, at least as far as women
who are classic "open-territory victims"' 4 are concerned, it assimi-
lates the privilege to rape accorded to husbands, and boyfriends with
11. L. CLARK & D. LEwis, supra note 9, at 115-20.
12. Id. at 120-24.
13. Id. at 129.
14. Open-territory victims are women who are "valueless" under the property
conception of rape law -" 'promiscuous' women, women who are 'idle', 'unemployed' or
'on welfare', living 'common law', 'separated' or 'divorced'" 
- who are not credible
victims, and therefore rapable. Id. at 123.
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that accorded to any man in society. Wives, lovers, and social com-
panions are rapable; but not in the same way, and not to the same
degree, as prostitutes and "loose" women. 15
The property conception also inadequately explains specific per-
formance in the case of "valuable" women because it makes status
of such women seem too self-consciously contrived. In explaining the
marital rape exemption, for instance, the property conception digs up
statements from Hale and Blackstone about the unity of husband
and wife (or, merger of the wife into the husband) into one juristic
person. 6 But no one worth responding to would try to defend the
exemption in these terms. They would instead defend it in terms of
actual (not hypothetical or presumed) consent implied from wedding
VOWS.
John Harman, for instance, argues that consent pursuant to the
marital relationship should properly be viewed as a kind of a license
to the husband to have sex. A wife grants blanket permission to her
husband, until she decides to revoke that permission by express re-
fusal.1 Harman defends this construction of the marital exemption
in terms of his account of harming and consent. Harm is a function
of the actual distress created in a situation. This distress can be of
two kinds: "situational" - "shock, surprise and anxiety at being in-
volved in an unanticipated situation" - and "reactive" - "the
shock and trauma that occur in reaction to the hostile acts of an-
other." Consent vitiates the first kind of harm - because the con-
senting "victim" anticipated the situation - but never the second.18
Harman's modified marital exemption is thus just because it is pre-
mised on the fact that once a wife impliedly (but actually) grants
permission to her husband to accomplish sexual access, she will not
15. As Catherine MacKinnon writes: "The law of rape divides the world of
women in spheres of consent according to how much say we are legally presumed to have
over sexual access to us by various categories of men." MacKinnon, Feminism, Marx-
ism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 648 (1983).
For a powerful description of the power all men have over "loose" women, see Nestle,
My Mother Liked to Fuck, in POWERS OF DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 468 (A.
Snitow, C. Stansell & S. Thompson eds. 1983).
16. See, e.g., Freeman, "'But If You Can't Rape Your Wife, Who[mi Can You
Rape?". The Marital Rape Exemption Re-examined, 15 FAM. L.Q. 1, 14-17 (1981);
Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1255-57 (1986); Note, The Marital Rape Exemption:
Legal Sanction of Spouse Abuse, 18 J. FAm. L. 565, 569-70 (1979-80).
17. Harman, Consent, Harm, and Marital Rape, 22 J. FAM. L. 423, 434-36
(1983-84) [hereinafter Harman, Marital Rape].
18. Id. at 440. See also Harman, Harm, Consent and Distress, 15 J. VALUE IN-
QUIRY 293 (1981).
be harmed unless she revokes permission, or unless he harms her in
Harman's second sense by abusing her.19 Harman's theory does not
justify only the marital exemption, of course; change wife to "wo-
man," husband to "man," and wedding vow to "prior relation," and
he justifies all of the substantive rape law doctrines which I criticize
in this essay.20
The property conception has nothing fruitful to say against
Harman. It can argue that since women are property, they, like
slaves, are legally unable to give or withhold consent to harm in-
flicted by their masters; thus, Harman's reliance on "consent" is
fruitless. But women are not literally the property of men,, and
(when they are competent adults) they are not legally unable to con-
sent. The problem with Harman's account is the complexity of, not
the capacity to, consent.
The property conception focuses on the ways in which the rape
victim is constructed under the law. It most fruitfully explains the
ways in which open territory victims become "rapable' - the
abuses of sexual history evidence, lax police response to rape victims,
the harshest forms of the marital exemption, and the utmost resis-
tance standard. It is toward these features of the law of'forcible rape
that feminist criticism allied with the rape reform movement has
turned.21 But while a property-conception-focused critique can at-
tack the chastity inquiry, it has nothing to say about the universal
conduct-with-accused exception to rape shield statutes. It can attack
the marital exemption, but has nothing to say against Harman's de-
fense and partial retrenchment. It can attack utmost resistance with-
out having further to say about subtler issues of force and mens rea
which are implicated in the construction of the rapist. I do not fi-
19. Harman, Marital Rape, supra note 17, at 440.
20. The interpretation of the marital exemption which he rejects as being indefen-
sible (both as a construction of a just marital exemption and as an accurate account of
acts of sexual promising) is precisely the one that I propose to apply to rape law:
The idea that implied consent is essentially a contractual promise leads to the
notion that it creates a legal right in the husband to sexual relations. The es-
sence of a legal right, in turn, is that the right-holder enjoys a power to compel
the performance of (or abstinence from) some act by another. When such a
right derives from a contract, the other who can be compelled is usually the
other party(ies) to the contract. "Power to compel" means at least noninterfer-
ence by the state when the right-holder attempts to insure performance. Most
often it means intervention by the state on the side of the right-holder to insure
performance or compensation by the other party. The exemption of the hus-
band from prosecution for forced intercourse is thus bound intimately to an
interpretation of implied consent as a right-establishing contractual promise.
Id. at 433-34 (footnote omitted). I differ with Harman when he purports to identify
permissive consent-acts with volitional anticipation and assumption of situational harm.
I'm not sure how to recognize "volitional" behavior in a regime which enforces a marital
exemption.
21. See Katz, Liberal Feminism and the Politics of Rape (Book Review), 24 AM.
CRIM. L. Rav. 1007, 1009-10 (1987).
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nally think the property conception is wrong.2 But I also do not
think that it is a universal vantage point from which all of the injus-
tices of rape law can be attacked. I will examine rape law from a
different point of view.
II. THE ENFORCEMENT OF EXPECTATIONS IN THE DEFINITION OF
THE RAPE VICTIM
A. The Marital Rape Exemption
Lord Mathew Hale's 250-year-old dictum "the husband cannot be
guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by
their mutual matrimonial consent and contract, the wife hath given
up herself in this kind unto her husband which she cannot retract," 23
is now part of the received wisdom of the common law in the United
States. Only ten states do not recognize the marital exemption in
any form, eight by legislative action24 and two by judicial action;25
another seven exempt the husband only from lower (usually misde-
meanor-level) grades of rape.26 In two-thirds of the states the exemp-
22. Sadly, the kinds of reforms the property conception has inspired have changed
very little about the legal response to the fact of rape in women's lives. Studies indicate
that while rape law reform has some positive impact on arrest and conviction rates for
"real" rapes (i.e., blitz rapes), they do little more than rearrange the criminal "labels"
attached to other kinds of rape. See J. MARSH, A. GEIST & N. CAPLAN, RAPE AND THE
LIMIrS OF LAW REFORM 25-39, 85-104 (1982) (Michigan study); Loh, The Impact of
Common Law and Reform Rape Statutes on Prosecution: An Empirical Study, 55
WASH. L. REV. 543 (1980) (Washington study); Loh, Q: What Has Reform of Rape
Legislation Wrought? A: Truth in Criminal Labelling, 37:4 J. Soc. IssuEs 28 (Fall
1981) (Washington study); Polk, Rape Reform and Criminal Justice Processing, 31
CRIME & DELINQ. 191 (1985) (California study).
But the reforms have made the experience of the rape victim in the criminal justice
system much less traumatic. J. MARSH, A. GEIST & N. CAPLAN, supra, at 67-84.
23. 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (1736), quoted
in Note, Legal Sanction of Spouse Abuse, supra note 16, at 566.
For an interesting account of how Hale might have been personally motivated to reach
this conclusion, see Geis, Lord Hale, Witches, and Rape, 5 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'Y 26, 40
(1978).
24. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West. 1976 & Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
21-3502 (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 22 (West 1970 & Supp. 1988); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 28-319, -320 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(b) (West 1982); OR.
REV. STAT. § 163.355-.375 (1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (Supp. 1988); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 940.225(6) (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
25. Warren v. State, 225 Ga. 151, 336 S.E.2d 221 (1985); People v. Liberta, 64
N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020
(1985).
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261-62 (West 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
67(b), -70(b) (West 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.2-.4 (West 1979); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 3128 (Purdon Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.040, .050, .060(1)
(West 1988); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-6 (1984); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-307 (1977).
tion applies with full force.
The scope of the exemption's application varies with the nature of
the marital relationship. In some states it ceases to apply when the
spouses are actually living apart; others require legal separation or a
pending application for separation; in two states17 only a final di-
vorce decree terminates operation of the exemption.28 But, signifi-
cantly, at least seven states have expanded the exemption recently to
cover not only spouses, but cohabitators and social companions. 9
1. The Justifications for the Marital Exemption
Hale's presumption of the wife's consent rests on two propositions:
(1) a wife is the "mere chattel" of her husband, his to do with what
he wishes; and (2) a husband and wife are one legal entity.30 From
this foundation evolved Blackstone's "unities" doctrine, by which the
husband and wife were deemed "one person in law": "[T]he very
being or legal existence of the women is suspended during the mar-
riage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband; under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs eve-
rything." 31 By virtue of this unity a husband could not rape his wife
any more than he could rape himself. 32 Of course, no one takes these
legal principles seriously today.
The modern justifications for the marital exemption have in com-
mon a notion of the irrevocability of once-given consent to sexual
contact, at least until the wife begins to take formal action to dis-
solve the marriage. One argument asserts that blanket consent is a
term of the marriage contract. 3 Another argues that the wife has
impliedly consented to permanent access. 34 Since the "marriage con-
tract" is predominantly an implied one, both of these arguments
amount to the same thing - that there is something about prior
voluntary intimacy which lowers the degree of necessary voluntari-
ness for subsequent acts.
There is yet another justification for the marital exemption which
is not often recognized: the ideology of "separate spheres." 35 The
27. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-18(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1 (1988).
28. See Note, To Have and To Hold, supra note 16, at 1259-60.
29. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-67(b) (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 764(2) &
775(2) (1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West 1979); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §
510.010(3) (Baldwin 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-51 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 18,
§ 3103 (Purdon Supp. 1988); W. VA. CODE § 61- 8B-1(2) (Supp. 1988).
30. Freeman, supra note 16, at 16-17.
31. J.W. EHRLICH. EHRLICH'S BLACKSTONE 83 (1959).
32. See Note, Legal Sanction of Spouse Abuse, supra note 16, at 569-70.
33. Id. at 567.
34. Id; Note, To Have and To Hold, supra note 16, at 1256.
35. Note, To Have and To Hold, supra note 16, at 1257-58.
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family, and all that occurs within it, is private, contrasted with the
public world of politics, economics, and civic life generally." Human
actions, particularly men's actions, are accorded different normative
statuses simply by virtue of their occurring within one sphere or the
other:
[T]he legitimacy of male rule both within and outside the family is rein-
forced - despite the challenges to it that are inherent in individualism -
on the grounds that the interests of the family are totally united, that fam-
ily relations, unlike those outside, are based only on love, and that there-
fore husbands and fathers can be safely entrusted with power within the
household and with the right of representing their families' interests in the
political realm.37
Therefore, when men force their wives to have sex, the act is not
rape, because rape does not occur in the family; instead, the wife
was performing "the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.""8
However, it is easy to overstate this argument: first, because the
family is becoming increasingly "deprivatized" as the welfare state
intervenes; second, because it is by no means clear that the erection
of a zone of legal privilege around the exercise of male power in the
family makes the family "private." 9 But, if there is any feature of
life to which the ideology of privacy strongly attaches, it is the mari-
tal bed. Rape disappears behind the veil draped about the family,
and the experience of raped wives is erased from the public record.
The separate spheres justification is sometimes dressed up in mod-
ern constitutional language and presented as a privacy justification.
While sexual exploitation is regrettable, this argument goes, as long
as it is nonviolent it cannot be criminally addressed without tram-
pling upon Griswold v. Connecticut's40 principle of marital privacy.
Removing the marital exemption would obligate the state to violate
the sanctity of the bedroom by investigating the most intimate de-
tails of a couple's sexual and emotional lives. But Griswold's progeny
- most notably Eisenstadt v. Baird4 and Roe v. Wade42 - strongly
affirm a woman's right to bodily integrity. State protection of the
36. See, e.g., Okin, Women and the Making of the Sentimental Family, 11 PHIL.
PUB. AFF. 65, 72-74 (1982).
37. Id. at 74 (emphasis supplied).
38. Note, To Have and to Hold, supra note 16, at 1257-58.
39. See Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Re-
form, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1509-13, 1535-39 (1983).
40. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
41. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (all persons have a right to access to
contraception).
42. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (women have a right to terminate pregnancy before
viability).
man's interest in preserving sexual/marital privacy during the course
of a rape trial or investigation cannot stand over a woman's stronger
right to bodily integrity, without a compelling state interest.43
There are several pragmatic excuses for the marital exemption:
(1) It is feared that removing the exemption will allow wives to use
rape accusations for blackmail.44 This is a charge which is always
leveled at potential rape victims - that they will lie - and never
proven, since there is no evidence that rape is falsely reported more
than any other crime.45 (2) Difficulties of proof are also raised,46 al-
though they are no more difficult in marital rape than in other kinds
of rapes. (3) The possibility of reconciliation is often raised along
with the observation that criminal charges or investigation would
certainly make this impossible.47 This last excuse is undoubtedly true
- but it is not much of an excuse. What kind of reconciliation
would this be? On whose terms? Such reconciliation more often
demonstrates "psychological dependence upon a violent, abusive hus-
band" then it does genuine healing; sexual intimacy does not erase
violent blows (although the converse is true).48
2. The Role of Expectations
Except for the "mere chattel" justification, which has not been
taken literally since the days of Lord Hale himself, the justifications
for the marital exemption, and the excuses offered against its repeal,
show that expectations of subsequent sexual access attached to prior
voluntary acts are perceived to legitimately lower the amount of will-
ingness required to validate sexual overtures. By marrying, women
raised expectations that men were entitled to enforce.
Seen in this light, legal doctrine seemingly opposed to the marital
exemption become an entrenchment of it. For example: An Arizona
case, State v. Bateman,49 involved the conviction of a man on sod-
omy charges for the oral rape of his wife. The court rejected the
privacy justification, noting that none of the privacy cases involved
"sexual misconduct": "Certainly the State retains a compelling in-
terest in protecting its citizens from violence even if the combatants
are married to one another." 50 One student note concluded that
Bateman and similar cases "indicate a trend toward judicial recogni-
43. See Note, To Have and to Hold, supra note 16, at 1262-64.
44. Freeman, supra note 16, at 19.
45. On the contrary, false reports of rape are probably less frequent than of other
crimes. S. KATZ & M. MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM: A SYNTHESIS OF
RESEARCH FINDINGS 212-13 (1979).
46. Freeman, supra note 16, at 18-19.
47. Id. at 19-20.
48. Note, To Have and to Hold, supra note 16, at 1268-69.
49. 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976).
50. Id. at 109, 547 P.2d at 9.
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tion that forced sexual relations should not be protected within the
marital relationship."51 But Bateman does nothing of the kind; all it
does is affirm the State's ability to proscribe certain kinds of sexual
acts. Bateman's actions went beyond the terms of the marriage con-
tract, as the state defined it. By drawing a careful line between rapes
that fall under the terms of the contract (those involving "normal"
sex) and rapes that do not (those involving "unnatural" sex), and
affirming the state's police power to punish those which do not, the
Bateman court sharpened the marital exemption. To the extent that
Bateman limits the scope of the exemption, it also legitimizes it.
As the marital exemption is broadened to include cohabitators and
social acquaintances, 52 it will become increasingly difficult to view it
in terms of the marriage contract. Instead, we must see the exemp-
tion as a particular application of a more general proposition, by
which proximate (social) relations with men lower a woman's options
for autonomously choosing her sexual behavior. In the official com-
mentary to Hawaii's criminal code there appears a statement of this
proposition's relationship to the way wives (and girlfriends) are
treated under rape law, regardless of the specific doctrine involved:
The degree and nature of the victim's acquaintance with the actor as a
mitigating circumstance ... is based on the theory that a person who re-
sorts to sexual aggression against a female who has permitted previous sex-
ual intercourse, and who has thereby furnished to some extent an incentive
to further amorous advances, presents less of a social danger than the per-
son who commits sexual aggression against a female who is not his volun-
tary social companion or with whom he has not been previously familiar.
Moreover, a male who forces sexual intercourse in such situations does not
deserve the same degree of moral condemnation, as the male who forces
sexual intercourse upon a female with whom he has little or no
acquaintance."
Does the acquaintance-rapist really represent "less of a social dan-
ger?" On the individual level, he probably does more harm than his
nonacquaintance counterpart performing essentially the same ac-
tions. Fear is the most common form of psychological distress found
among victims of rape and attempted rape.54 Measured in terms of
51. Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, supra note 16, at 578.
52. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
53. HAW. REV. STAT., Commentary to § 707-730 to 732 (1976 & Supp. 1984).
54. Janoff-Bulman, Characterological Versus Behavioral Self - Blame: Inquir-
ies into Depression and Rape, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 1798, 1801(1979).
This fear, in diffuse form, touches all women in society as rape operates as a system of
social control. See S. GRIFFIN, RAPE: THE POLITICS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 69-91 (rev. ed.
1986); Riger & Gordon, The Fear of Rape: A Study in Social Control, 37:4 J. Soc.
IssuEs 71 (Fall 1981).
consequent perceptions of social safety, the intensity of subsequent
fear seems to be a function of the experience itself. If some kind of
penile contact takes place, one study found that four-fifths of survi-
vors experienced diffuse fear or fear that severely impaired function-
ing; if none took place (even though other kinds of sexual contact,
like digital penetration, did), only a third of the survivors exper-
ienced fear at this level (although everyone experienced some fear
regardless of the circumstances).55 Thus, it is not the identity of the
actor, but the character of the act, that determines the degree of
subsequent fear.
The second most frequent consequent psychological distress
among rape victims is self-blame.56 Self-blame can be adaptive or
maladaptive, depending upon its direction and ability to be put to
constructive use: where it is "situational" (focused "on one's own be-
havior") it can function to aid the victim's control over a fearful
world; where it is "characterological" (focused on "an overall view
of the kind of people individuals perceive themselves to be"), it can
lead to self-condemnation and moral despair. 57
In the case of rape, for example, a woman can blame herself for having
walked down a street alone at night or for having let a particular man into
her apartment (behavioral blame), or she can blame herself for being "too
trusting and unable to say no" or a "careless person who is unable to stay
out of trouble." 58
Situational self-blame leads (1) to a belief that the victimization was
"caused" by modifiable behavior, and (2) that the victimization can
be avoided in the future; both of these restore control and provide
less of a basis for diffuse fear. 9 On the other hand, characterological
self-blame leads the victim (1) to believe that she can do little or
nothing about her vulnerability, and (2) to "begin to perceive herself
as a chronic victim." 6 0
Characterological self-blame is more likely to be correlated with
acquaintance rape.61 We should thus expect that, individually, ac-
quaintance-rapists are going to harm their victims more, if only to
the degree that characterological self-blame is likely to follow their
acts. Perhaps, then, the Hawaii commentary tries to suggest that ac-
quaintance-rapists are less of a social danger in the' aggregate be-
cause stranger-rapists are far more common. However, this is not
55. Scheppele & Bart, Through Women's Eyes: Defining Danger in the Wake of
Sexual Assault, 39:2 J. Soc. IssuEs 63, 75-76 (Spring 1983).
56. Janoff-Bulman, supra note 54, at 1801.
57. id. at 1799.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1802.
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. See, e.g., Bart, A Study of Women Who Were Raped and Avoided Rape,
37:4 J. Soc. IssuEs 123, 131-35 (Fall 1981) (women are much less likely to avoid
threatened rape when they know the man who threatens them).
[VOL. 26: 21, 1989] Law of Forcible Rape
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
supported by available research on rape. Although the rates attribu-
table to strangers vary enormously, depending upon the age of the
victims, the source of reports (reported or unreported rapes), the
city, and the way "stranger" is defined by the study, at least a third
and perhaps as many as a half of all rapes are committed by
acquaintances. 2
And how is he deserving of less "moral condemnation?" Trust is
the foundation of the human activities which we consider susceptible
to "further amorous advances."8 3 And trust is a significant ethical
category, a deep source of moral value in human arrangements. 4
The acquaintance-rapist commits an egregious violation of trust, far
worse than the stranger, because he does violence to twice-given
trust: first, his victim invests in him the minimal social trust any
person would receive; second, he is specifically trusted by her when
she lets him enter her life, increasing her vulnerability to his coercive
behavior. It is probably splitting fine moral hairs to assert that the
stranger-rapist is less morally culpable for his violation of trust than
the acquaintance; but it is outrageous to boldly state the reverse.
What the Commentary may mean is that men who enter into
proximate relations with women -- particularly relations open to
"further amorous advances" - invest an expectation in sexual ac-
cess. Then the lesser social danger and moral blameworthiness of the
acquaintance-rapist is clear. He is doing something which is normal
and rightful - taking what is legitimately his. The application of
contractarian thinking to such a relation represents a denial of the
autonomous choice of women and is forcefully emblematic of the
second-class status of the women to whom this doctrine applies."5
Fifteen percent or more of married women are forced to grant
their husband sexual access against their will.66 Some call this rape.
The law, by and large, does not; and in so doing it erases the experi-
ence completely, leaving the victims to suffer in silence.
62. See S. KATZ & M. MAZUR, supra note 45, at 108-16.
63. See Hardwig, Should Women Think in Terms of Rights?, 94 ETHIcs 441
(1984).
64. See Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96 ETHIcs 231 (1986); Baier, What Do
Women Want In a Moral Theory?, 19 Nous 53 (1985). Lynne Henderson specifically
describes the central harms of rape in terms which distinguish it from the condition of
trust. Henderson, Review Essay: What Makes Rape a Crime, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J.
193, 226 (1987-88.).
65. Baier, supra note 64, at 241.
66. D. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 57-72 (1983).
B. The Conduct-with-Accused Exception to Rape Shield Statutes
1. Conduct-with-Accused Evidence
At one time it was quite common to hear commentators claim that
the rape victim was subject to double victimization: once by the rap-
ist, and once by the criminal justice system. If the victim survived
the police investigatory process without having her claim deemed un-
founded, 7 and saw the complaint go to trial, she would have to
ready herself for the most unsolicitous treatment afforded any victim
of crime in our system. Her cross-examination by the accused's at-
torney would generally be "grueling," covering the rape in minute
detail.6 8 She might be asked if she enjoyed the experience.6 9 And
finally, she would be interrogated at length about her sexual history,
all the while being humiliated by the defense counsel's (not always)
unspoken accusations of promiscuity and dishonesty. The justifica-
tion for this interrogation, in the prosaic and oft-quoted words of
People v. Abbot, is this: "[Will] you not more readily infer assent in
the practiced Messalina, in loose attire than in the reserved and vir-
tuous Lucretia? '7 0 In the early 1970s this type of interrogation
would occur, although without the classical allusions.7'
Sexual history evidence, when it was routinely admitted, was
presented as a species of "character" or "propensity" evidence, of-
fered to demonstrate "that a person possessing a particular character
trait acted in conformity with that trait on the occasion in ques-
67. "Unfounding" occurs when the police or prosecutor decide that there is no
basis for an investigation or charge. For a study discussing the social attitudes of crimi-
nal justice professionals which relate to the unfounding of complaints, see Feldman-Sum-
mers & Palmer, Rape as Viewed By Judges, Prosecutors, and Police Officers, 7 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 19 (1980).
The emotional toll unfounding practices take on rape victims is explored in Cluss,
Boughton, Frank, Stewart & West, The Rape Victim: Psychological Correlates of Par-
ticipation in the Legal Process, 10 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 342 (1983); and Resick, The
Trauma of Rape and the Criminal Justice System, 9 JUST. SYSTEM J. 52 (1984).
68. Note, The Victim In a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 335, 351 (1973).
69. Bohmer & Blumberg, Twice Traumatized: The Rape Victim and the Court,
58 JUDICATURE 391, 396 (1975). Or, as Marge Piercy writes: "There is no difference
between being raped and being run over by a truck except that afterward men ask if you
enjoyed it." Piercy, Missoula Rape Poem (quoted in Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's
Tribulation: Rape Cases In the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13 n.86 (1977)).
70. 19 Wend. 192, 195 (N.Y. 1838).
For those readers who are unfamiliar with Roman social history, Lucretia is the
mythic paragon of woman's virtue (although the Latin virtus matronae is a conundrum)
whom Tarquin threatened to kill and dishonor by leaving her naked corpse next to that
of a slave's, unless she submitted to his lusts. She did, and was under Roman law techni-
cally raped; but she committed suicide rather than live defiled. S. POMEROY, GODDESSES,
WHORES, WIVES AND SLAVES: WOMEN IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY 160-61 (1975). Mes-
salina was a real Roman empress to whom adultery was an "everyday affair." J. BAL-
SDON, ROMAN WOMEN: THEIR HISTORY AND HABITS 97 (1983).
71. See, e.g., D. RUSSELL, supra note 66, at 9-10.
[VOL 26: 21, 1989] Law of Forcible Rape
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
tion.' ' 72 A description of a person's general propensities or character
is hardly, in any meaningful sense, an account of what caused a par-
ticular act, let alone a prediction of the act's occurrence. 3 Thus,
such evidence was generally inadmissible, except for a few particular
purposes, in criminal trials. The accused was allowed to introduce
character evidence in order to demonstrate (1) that he or she was
known for or possessed a generally good character in the community
(character witnesses), (2) that the victim was of bad character (in
homicide or rape cases), and (3) that the witness was not credible.7 4
But under the "multiple uses" doctrine, evidence which was osten-
sibly offered for a non-character or non-propensity purpose, but
which would allow the jury to independently draw character infer-
ences, was admissible under the traditional standard (i.e., the offered
evidence's relevance outweighed its inflammatory nature) .7
Sexual history evidence by its very nature serves as the basis of
simultaneous inferences. First, it goes to the credibility of the com-
plainant "based upon the theory that a moral flaw in one area of her
character (sexual laxity) reflected on other aspects of her character
(e.g., honesty) as well."' 76 Second, it goes to the actual issue of con-
sent on the theory that a woman who said yes once will likely say yes
again. I will not deal with the first point, the theory of Lucretia and
Messalina, which divides the world into good women (those who
don't) and bad women (those who do); it is of little persuasive value
today.77 The second point, however, is one that lingers in various
forms, and it is worth seeing how intelligent and sensitive people
might agree with it, and in what ways they would be wrong to do so.
A "modern" argument for the admissibility of general sexual his-
tory evidence, one which does not fall simple-mindedly into the good
woman/bad woman prejudice trap, would go something like this:
72. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal
for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 777 (1986); see also Berger, supra note
69, at 55-56.
73. See Letwin, 'Unchaste Character,' Ideology, and the California Rape Evi-
dence Laws, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 35, 48 (1980); see also, Adler, The Relevance of Sexual
History Evidence in Rape: Problems of Subjective Interpretation, 1985 CRIM. L. REV.
769 (1985).
74. See Galvin, supra note 72, at 781-87.
75. Id. at 788-91.
76. Letwin, supra note 73, at 46.
77. But note how the property-centered conception of rape law explains this ra-
tionale: Messalina and Lucretia are only ideologically moral types; in reality, they are
market types. Messalina is the valuable/valued sexual commodity, Lucretia the poor
trustee and waster. Under the martial exemption, the property conception elucidates an
outmoded justificatory structure.
While all references to "prior unchastity" (or other pejorative language)
would appropriately be stricken from the approved courtroom rhetoric,
prior sexual activity should simply be seen as a morally neutral basis for
inferring subsequent consent. Prior sexual indulgence is, in this view, not
offered to prove morally reprehensible behavior; rather, it is offered because
it suggests a receptivity, an interest, a taste, or at the very least, the absence
of unalterable antipathy, and perhaps, depending on frequency, even some
enthusiasm for the activity.
78
There are good reasons to be skeptical about this argument. Rela-
tively little is understood about sexual behavior; the jury "will not be
well equipped to draw rational inferences from the complainant's
earlier sexual experiences."' Even if the evidence is not offered on
sexually-stereotypic premises, there is no guarantee the jury will not
put it to stereotypic use.
It is not fanciful to suppose that jurors confronted with evidence of a previ-
ously sexually active rape complainant will adopt unarticulated premises
such as: "She got what she deserved," i.e., even if she were raped, she has
at long last been punished for past misdeeds; she is previously "damaged
property," i.e., she lacks purity and has therefore suffered no great addi-
tional harm; or "All women want to be raped," and the evidence of prior
"unchaste" conduct is somehow seen as brilliant confirmation of these wide-
spread male fantasies.80
A New Jersey study of public attitudes toward rape confirms this.
One thousand fifty-six people were asked to agree or disagree with a
series of statements. The following illustrate most clearly these
prejudices: "In forcible rape, the victim never causes the crime."
(thirty-seven percent concurred); "A raped woman is a less desirable
woman." (fourteen percent concurred); "Most women secretly desire
to be raped." (thirteen percent); "It would do some women some
good to get raped." (ten percent); "Women provoke rape by their
appearance or behavior." (sixty-six percent); "In most cases when a
woman was raped, she was asking for it." (eleven percent); "Rape of
a woman by a man she knows can be defined as a 'woman who
changed her mind afterward.'" (twenty-nine percent); "A raped wo-
man is a responsible victim, not an innocent one." (sixteen
percent.) 81
The "modern argument" resurrects the probative worth of sexual
history evidence, but does nothing to alleviate fears about the preju-
dicial effect of such evidence. It is thus simply not an argument that,
in any significant way, is about the relevance of sexual history
evidence.
78. Letwin, supra note 73 at 57.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 57-58.
81. H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE: A STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGY AND
LAw 50-51 (1980).
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2. Rape Shield Statutes
Rape shield statutes, which control the introduction of sexual his-
tory evidence in rape cases, exist in some form in forty-eight states,
the federal courts, and the military courts-martial. In Arizona the
sexual history of rape victims is shielded by judicial decision. In
Utah there is no rape shield at all, and chastity or sexual history is
admissible on the issue of consent. 2
There are four basic rape shield schemes;" these are their chief
features:
(1) Twenty-four states84 follow Michigan's lead in barring the ad-
mission of any sexual history evidence, for any purpose, with two
exceptions: sexual history with the accused and explanation of physi-
cal evidence. Only two of these states-Montana and Virginia -
impose any kind of proximity requirement on the admission of evi-
dence regarding sexual history with the accused. Arizona does not
have a rape shield statute, but its judicially-defined standards follow
these approaches. In State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court,85 the Ari-
zona Supreme Court held that (a) sexual history evidence which
goes to character is inadmissible, and (b) evidence of prior acts
which goes to consent is also inadmissible unless it is offered to es-
tablish sexual history with the defendant, to rebut physical evidence,
or to rebut prosecution claims about the complainant's chastity. Evi-
dence which falls under any of these exceptions must be admitted
after an in camera determination of relevance.86
82. See, e.g., State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101, 105-06 (Utah 1985); State v. Johns,
615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1980); State v. Howard, 544 P.2d 466, 470 (Utah 1975).
83. Galvin, supra note 72, at 773-76.
84. ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (1986 & Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
794.022(2)-(3) (West 1976 & Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 38202 (Harrison 1981 &
Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-7 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1988);
IND. CODE. ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1988 ); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
510.145 (Baldwin 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:498 (West 1981 & Supp. 1988); ME.
R. EvID. 412; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (1988); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233,
§ 21B (West 1986 & Supp. 1988); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.520 (West Supp.
1988); MINN. R. EVID. 404(c); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015 (Vernon Supp. 1988); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(4) (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-321 (1985 & Supp. 1987);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (1985 & Supp. 1988); N.C. R. EVID. 412; OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1988); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104 (Pur-
don 1983 & Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp.
1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-17-119 (1982 & Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
3255 (Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7 (1988); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 972.11(2)
(West 1985 & Supp. 1988).
85. 113 Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d 946 (1976).
86. Id. at 29, 545 P.2d at 953.
(2) Eleven states8 declare that sexual history evidence is admissi-
ble if the judge rules in camera that it is relevant. Alaska and New
Jersey impose a slightly stricter rule, requiring (a) the relevancy de-
termination to take the complainant's privacy interests into account,
and (b) a heightened level of relevancy scrutiny where the offered
evidence bears on sexual history older than one year prior to the act
in question. Colorado, Rhode Island, and Wyoming specifically ex-
empt evidence of sexual history with the accused from the operation
of their statute.
(3) In the federal courts,88 the military courts-martial,8 9 and five
states,90 sexual history evidence is barred unless (a) the court in
camera finds evidence of sexual history with the accused or explana-
tion of physical evidence relevant, or (b) the evidence must be ad-
mitted to save the trial from constitutional infirmity.9
(4) Five states9 2 bar all sexual evidence going to the issue of con-
sent except for history with the accused, but permit evidence im-
peaching the credibility of the complainant.93 Two states9" reverse
this, banning credibility evidence but allowing evidence of sexual his-
tory generally which goes to the issue of consent.95
In forty-six states, the federal courts, and the military courts-mar-
tial, evidence of the victim's sexual history with her rapist is admissi-
ble on a minimal showing (its probativeness must outweigh its preju-
dicial effect). In two states this inquiry is tempered with a one-year
proximity rule, so that evidence of sexual behavior more than one
year before the alleged rape is presumptively inadmissible. In two
more states this proximity requirement is attached to a heightened
analysis which takes the complainant's privacy interests into
87. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045(a) (1984 & Supp. 1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-
42-101 (1987 & Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT, § 18-3-407 (1986 & Supp. 1988);
IDAHO CODE § 18-6105 (1987 & Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3525 (Supp.
1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.1-.3 (West Supp. 1988); N.M. R. EVID. 413; R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13 (1981 & Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-22-15
(1988); TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 412; Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-312 (1988).
88. FED. R. EVID. 412.
89. S. SALTZBURG, MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE 412 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp.
1988).
90. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86f (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); HAW. R. EVID.
412; IOWA R. EVID. 412; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1981); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40.210 (1988).
91. For a discussion of the constitutional dimension of rapeshield provisions, see
infra notes 107-112 and accompanying text.
92. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1103(b) (West Supp. 1986); DEL CODE ANN. tit.
11, §§ 3508, 3509 (1979); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-68, 97-3-70 (Supp. 1985); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-2-14 to -15 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 740 (West Supp.
1985).
93. Galvin, supra note 72, at 894.
94. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 48.069, 50.090 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A-
44.020 (West Supp. 1986).
95. Galvin, supra note 72, at 900.
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account.
3. Justifications for the Exception
The justification for the conduct-with-defendant exception is not
apparent on the surface. Why doesn't the argument offered above
against the general use of sexual history apply with equal force to
this specific use? One student note, for instance, recognized that this
exception limits the effective scope of women's sexual choice, but
still unambiguously endorsed its validity 6 I am going to examine a
number of justifications advanced for this exception in order to
demonstrate that none of them can justify it without reliance on the
validation and enforcement of expectations of sexual access.
Harriet Galvin summarily concludes that such evidence "is proba-
tive of the complainant's state of mind toward the particular defend-
ant, permitting an inference that the state of mind continued to the
occasion in question. ' 97 Hers is the dominant view, which takes the
exception as one of the intuitions which underlie the justification of
rape shield statutes generally.9 8 Professors Wright and Graham
modify this position slightly by limiting the scope of the exception to
proper handling, which means not applying it where there is "uncon-
troverted and credible evidence of the use of force."99 They also offer
two feeble excuses for retaining the exception: (1) allowing such evi-
dence will not deter reporting, one of the infirmities of the old re-
gime, since most rapes are stranger rapes;10e and (2) the harshness
of the exception is mitigated by the judge's determination of rele-
vance before admission of such evidence.101 If there is any substance
to this line of thought at all, I suppose, as Vivian Berger argues, that
it just makes sense to most of us to suspect the nonvoluntariness of
someone in a sexual relationship:
Although in unusual circumstances (a "one night stand" some ten years
earlier) even this could be deemed irrelevant, a history of intimacies with
the accused would ordinarily tend to bolster a claim of consent to yet an-
other sexual encounter. The inference from past to present behavior does
96. Note, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REV.
613, 624 (1976).
97. Galvin, supra note 72, at 815.
98. See also 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 5389 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988); Curley, Excusing Rape, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 325,
349-50 (1976); Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amend-
ment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 571 (1980).
99. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 98, § 5389, at 599 n. 4.
100. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
101. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 98, at 599-600.
not, in the cases of third party acts, rest on highly dubious beliefs about
"women who do" and "women who don't" but rather relies on common
sense and practical psychology. Admission of the proof "supplies the ac-
cused with a circumstance making it probable that he did not obtain by
violence what he might have secured by persuasion .... "I
Kenneth Ordover justifies the exception on the basis of a pattern
of similar behavior which is inherently more probative than general
propensity evidence:
The approach suggested here will limit admissibility to evidence demonstra-
bly related to the conduct presently under investigation - i.e., past conduct
occurring under circumstances substantially similar to those of the alleged
rape. This view comports with longstanding evidentiary principles. For ex-
ample, if the prosecution seeks to prove that robbery defendant X is the
same person who robbed others under similar circumstances, the prior acts
may be offered to show a modus operandi pointing to identity. Evidence of
the prior robberies should be admissible only if there is clear and convincing
proof that X committed the robberies and that the method was nearly iden-
tical to circumstances of the present case. This reasoning allows the
factfinder to draw an inference of present conduct from past acts.103
On this view it is the nature of the acts which make up the com-
plainant's sexual history, not their mere existence, which is proba-
tive.'04 Ordover asserts that the common theme running through the
kinds of acts admissible as evidence under the exception - that they
involved sexual conduct with the accused - is sufficient to satisfy
his "pattern-of-behavior" standard for probativeness. But he also
paradoxically concludes that "dissimilar" acts of sexual conduct
would be properly admissible in this special instance, as long as their
dissimilarity is not "marked," or there is evidence of "proven
force."10 5
Leon Letwin offers an independent ground of justification for the
exception:
The goal of rationally untangling what happened between two persons on
the charged occasion requires one to understand the history of their sexual
relationship. Quite apart from any character implications, this prior rela-
tionship bears too heavily on the complainant's probable conduct on the
charged occasion, as well as on the motivation for her present accusation, to
be excluded.106
I take his point to be that when rape is charged within a sexual
relationship, a criminal court must function as a quasi-family court,
be especially sensitive to the possibilities of reconciliation, and be
especially sensitive to the possibility of false accusation.
Finally, some commentators argue that the conduct-with-accused
102. Berger, supra note 69, at 58-59 (quoting Bedgood v. State, 115 Ind. 275, 279,
17 N.E. 621, 623 (1888)).
103. Ordover, Admissibility of Patterns of Similar Sexual Conduct: The Unla-
mented Death of Character for Chastity, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 90, 113 (1977-78).
104. Id. at 93.
105. Id. at 117.
106. Letwin, supra note 73, at 72.
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exception is one of a small handful of exceptions which any rape
shield regime must possess in order to be constitutionally secure. The
sixth amendment's confrontation and compulsory process clauses
form the basis of a unitary right of the accused to present relevant
testimony on his or her behalf in a criminal proceeding. 10 7 The Su-
preme Court uses a balancing test to judge restrictions on the intro-
duction of evidence, weighing the state interest in exclusion against
the accused's right to offer relevant evidence in his or her defense.
The strength of the accused's interest, naturally enough, is substan-
tially a function of the probativeness of the evidence in question. In
Chambers v. Mississippi,'0 8 for example, the accused was prevented
from calling as a witness a man who had confessed, and then repudi-
ated his confession, to the murder with which the accused was
charged because of a state evidence rule which barred the impeach-
ment of any witness by the calling party. The Court held that Mis-
sissippi's justification of this "remnant of primitive English trial
practice"'109 was insubstantial when compared to the probativeness of
such evidence and the effect that it would have on the accused's de-
fense. In Davis v. Alaska,10 the Court held that a juvenile-shield
law (which barred evidence concerning the criminal record of a juve-
nile) could not bar character evidence impeaching the juvenile wit-
ness, where his testimony was crucial in the case. What tips the con-
stitutional balance in favor of rape-shield provisions is the
substantial privacy interest which a sexual history inquiry threatens;
but rape-shield laws are also truth-enhancing, since the admission of
sexual history evidence distorts the jury's view of the case in terms of
conventional sexual mores."' Yet the consensus is that rape shield
provisions must minimally exclude two categories of uses from their
prohibitions in order to pass constitutional muster: (1) Proof of spe-
cific instances of previous sexual conduct which explain the physical
evidence introduced by the prosecution (semen, pregnancy, venereal
disease, etc.); and (2) evidence of the complainant's sexual history
with the accused." 2
107. See Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of
Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567 (1978); Tanford & Bocchino, supra
note 98, at 556-60.
108. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
109. Id. at 296.
110. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
111. See Galvin, supra note 72, at 806; see also notes 80-81 and accompanying
text.
112. Id. at 807-08.
4. The Role of Expectations
We are now in a position to review the various justifications of-
fered for the exception, and to weigh the constitutional mandate at-
tached to it. We shall see that without the enforceability of expecta-
tions as a given premise, no justification for the exception can work.
The bald-faced assumption of Galvin, Berger, and others, who
treat the exception as a basic intuition which any rape shield regime
must cover, is essentially a "lingering consent" argument: the vic-
tim's consent to sexual activity is presumed to exist through time to
cover at least one other discrete act, the purported rape, unless there
is some clear "break" in the "chain" of consensual contact(s). By
permitting the accused to raise in the minds of the jury an inference
that such a chain existed, the exception forces the prosecution to
prove that this break occurred, and that it was sufficiently clear to
the accused. Thus, the strength of the "break" must be commensu-
rate with the strength of the expectations. In other words, when a
woman raises expectations, she must go to extra means to say no,
and have her "no" taken seriously." 3
Ordover's pattern-of-behavior justification for the exception gener-
ally fails on its face. The spirit of his test requires that the fact
which serves as the inclusion criterion for the pattern be relatively
specific and unique to the point being proved. "Sexual contact with
the accused" is not sufficiently specific to make evidence admissible
under the exclusion any more probative than the general run of sex-
ual history evidence which Ordover explicitly rejects as nonproba-
tive. If we separate the kinds of evidence presumptively admissible
under the exception into two categories - "sex with accused" and
"sex with accused plus other common characteristics" - then we
would be able to tease out a class of proposed facts ("sex with ac-
cused plus") which were so probative that under Davis v. Alaska
they would be admissible even if the general exception did not exist.
However, this evidence does not require a conduct-with-accused ex-
ception, since it would be admissible under an omnibus constitu-
tional-infirmity exception. Such an exception is already present in
many, and would probably be construed into most other, shield stat-
utes to save them in the face of a constitutional challenge. The other
evidence, whose admission is not constitutionally required, is insuffi-
ciently probative on Ordover's criterion to merit admission, and a
general exception to admit such evidence is justifiable only on the
terms of the previous argument.
The most sensible justification is the one offered.by Letwin; but it
proves little. His "helping-professions" approach to rapes which oc-
113. Cf. Harman, supra note 17.
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cur within a relationship represents an attempt to turn criminal
court into family court proceedings. Given his own argument about
the "slippery-slope" effects of admitting general sexual history evi-
dence (it allows the jury to impose prejudicial and unfounded notions
of conventional morality to the detriment of the ban on chastity-for-
character evidence), there is little reason to turn his sensible point
into a general justification for the exception.
Although rape shield laws signal an improvement in women's sex-
ual autonomy (by removing some of the possibility that conventional
morality will be used to frustrate women's sexual choice), they pos-
sess one pervasive and common flaw: they allow the introduction of
evidence concerning past sexual conduct between the complainant
and the accused. While such evidence may not necessarily allow con-
ventional moral beliefs to impeach the complainant unjustly, they
support the inference that the complainant "belongs" to the defend-
ant (she is his lover), or that she has issued (in express or implied
terms) blanket consent to sexual contact - perhaps even the contact
which prompted her to file charges. Assuming the propriety of en-
forcing, to some degree, men's expectations of continued sexual con-
tact, the exception is justified. Such evidence is probative since it will
help the jury understand the degree to which such expectations
should be presumed to alter the degree of sexual choice which the
woman is entitled to exercise. But without that assumption, evidence
under the exception is no more probative than the complainant's sex-
ual history in general, which is admittedly (except in Utah) non-
probative. And without this probativeness, the accused's interest in
introducing it will not be strong enough to outweigh the state's inter-
est in protecting women's sexual choice.
III. THE ENFORCEMENT OF EXPECTATIONS IN THE DEFINITION OF
THE RAPIST
Force, resistance, mistake, and mens rea all dance in a hectic orbit
about one another. It is impossible to talk about any of these issues
in terms other than of the other three. Taken together, the culpabil-
ity of men for rape is set at that point where no reasonable man can
possibly ignore the brutality of his actions. That men have a duty to
be careful, to inquire carefully about the voluntariness of women, to
refrain from exploiting subtle weaknesses, is fairly unthinkable. Only
the willfully brutal man is clearly guilty of rape. Thus, the rapist is
114. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
constructed to be a man who acts upon unreasonable expectations of
sexual access.
A. The Resistance Standard
Rape law has traditionally been skeptical about relying upon con-
sent acts as reliable indications of a woman's willingness to have
sex." 85 The Neo-Freudian commentators of the 1950s and 1960s (in-
cluding the drafters of the Model Penal Code) resorted to a number
of arguments to support their belief that an inquiry into the victim's
mental state was too uncertain a premise for criminal liability for
rape: (1) It is difficult to know when a woman is really being coerced
into sexual contact, or when her outward "no" is an inward "yes,"
especially when social convention requires her to refuse sexual access
to all but her husband. (2) She may have had no clear attitude at all
about the sexual act. Caught between social pressures to remain
chaste and other kinds of pressures (internal and interpersonal) to
engage in sex, she might have been psychologically as well as behav-
iorally ambivalent. (3) She may be masochistic, attracted to men
whose seductions would brutalize and shock the average conscience.
(4) She might have been the actual precipitator of rape, uncon-
sciously wishing to exorcise a general fear of rape by undergoing an
actual one. 16
In response, the courts attempted to shift away from a vague in-
quiry into the victim's state of mind and toward an easily ascertaina-
ble and unambiguous fact in the world: whether the woman resisted,
and whether the man accomplished the sexual contact by means of
force. These are really flip sides of the same inquiry. The advantage
to a resistance standard, it is argued, is that it allows the court to
examine "actual conduct," not vague intention.17 But consent is
conduct - a very wide range of both physical and verbal acts. The
conduct which the resistance standard examines is not a proxy for
consent - it is a direct indication of consent. This conduct consists
of those actions which turn a "seduction" into a "rape."'1 " This is, of
115. See Note, Towards a Consent Standard, supra note 96, at 628-35 (roots of
rape law's distrust of the consent inquiry lay in turn-of-the-century scholarly preoccupa-
tion with intercourse by trick).
116. Note, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L. Rrv. 680,
681-82 (1966) (citing Slovenko, A Panoramic Overview: Sexual Behavior and the Law,
in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 5, 51-54 (Slovenko ed. 1965)). See also Estrich,
Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1127-29 (1986); Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Ex-
ploration of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 65-
69 (1952).
117. Note, Resistance Standard, supra note 116, at 684.
118. In medieval canon law, the element distinguishing raptus (rape) from
stupruin (criminal seduction) was quite literally force. Where a woman's sexual choice
was frustrated by anything other than physical force or explicit threats of physical force,
the lesser charge of stupruin applied. Brundage, Rape and Seduction in Medieval Canon
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course, merely a circle: resistance is an objective indicia of rape be-
cause it indicates that the sexual contact in question was not a con-
sensual seduction. Apart from the consent standard, the resistance/
force inquiry has no meaning. The resistance standard is not a rejec-
tion of the consent standard but a reformulation of it in more defi-
nite terms in the world."'
The reason that the resistance standard works at all is because
vigorous resistance ties three "subjective" facts together into one
"objective" fact: (1) The victim's nonconsent can be inferred from
her active resistance; (2) the man's intention to proceed either
against her wishes, or in spite of her refusal, can be inferred from his
application (and escalation) of force; and (3) the interaction between
force and resistance make it likely that the man's attention was di-
rected toward the woman's resistance, and hence her nonconsent.
Proceeding from the fact that the underlying act of rape - sexual
contact - occurred, evidence of force overcoming resistance allows
the court to infer that the victim did not consent, that the accused
had the mens rea of rape, and that the accused was aware of the
victim's nonconsent. 2 ° Only ten states have done away with the re-
sistance standard completely. 12'
Susan Estrich identifies two broad consequences of using resis-
tance as a proxy for mens rea and consent. First, the focus of inquiry
rests upon the victim, making her character - her resilience, valor,
toughness - the turning-point for liability. A woman who fails ade-
quately to resist against force that is insufficient to infer mens rea is
accordingly "blamed" for her injury, in the sense that she was too
weak to protect herself. 22 As one judge puts it:
Law, in SEXUAL PRACTICES AND THE MEDIEVAL CHURCH 141, 143-47 (V. Bullough & J.
Brundage eds. 1982). Criminal liability for acts amounting to stuprum withered away
into statutory rape, until rape reformers began to reintroduce it in the form of lower-
grade sexual assault.
119. See id. at 684-88.
120. See Estrich, supra note 116, at 1099 ("The definitions of nonconsent as resis-
tance - in the older cases, as utmost resistance . . . - functions as a substitute for
mens. rea to ensure that the man has notice of the woman's nonconsent.") (footnotes
omitted).
121. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470 (1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.5 (West 1979);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.347(2) (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-IOA (1984); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2907.02(C) (Anderson Supp. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3107 (Pundon
1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-12 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3254(1) (Supp.
1986). The tenth state has not entirely eliminated the resistance standard, but it has
severely limited it. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(8) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
122. Estrich, supra note 116, at 1099-1100.
She must follow the natural instinct of every proud female to resist, by
more than mere words, the violation of her person by a stranger or an un-
welcomed friend. She must make it plain that she regards such sexual acts
as abhorrent and repugnant to her natural sense of pride.12 3
It hardly occurs to proponents of the resistance standard that they
may be asking too much of rape victims. Many rape victims freeze
when they are caught between the outrage of rape and the (probably
greater) outrage of bodily injury or death. Their first response is
shock, followed by fright and panic. The panic may become "frozen
panic" or a kind of "psychological infantilism" whereby the victim
disassociates (becomes passive), giving up all claims to sexual auton-
omy in exchange (hopefully) for survival. 24 In cases where there is
no doubt about there having been sexual contact between an unwill-
ing victim and accused, the crucial issue is not the man's guilt for
rape but whether a "rape" occurred at all. The victim's hurt is to-
tally erased if the rapist is not fully culpable. 125 Paradoxically, the
woman who is too weak to protect herself from harm is seen as un-
harmed by the very actions against which she cannot protect her-
self.126 Second, the resistance standard's internal logic leads to over-
broad application. Even where the accused clearly possesses the
mens rea for rape, a lack of resistance will exculpate him. Thus, the
accused can "bootstrap" himself into a higher level of review. Even
if his mental state is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he cannot be
guilty unless he picks a victim of sufficient vigilance and valor to
resist.117
The resistance standard compels courts to conclude that even in
cases where there is no doubt as to nonconsent, where there was no
force used to accomplish sexual contact - because the victim was
too afraid to resist - there was no rape. As Estrich puts it, "the
woman was not forced to engage in sex, but the sex engaged in was
against her will.' 28 Such conclusions are paradoxical, unless one
adopts as the paradigm case of "force" the "traditional male notion
of a fight." Estrich is right in concluding that "[t]o say that there is
no 'force' in such a situation is to create a gulf between power and
123. State v. Rusk, 289 Md. 230, 255, 424 A.2d 720, 733 (1981) (Cole, J.,
dissenting).
124. See S. ITZ & M. MAZUR, supra note 45, at 173; Schwartz, An Argument
for the Elimination of the Resistance Requirement from the Definition of Forcible
Rape, 16 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 567, 577, 580-82 (1983).
125. Estrich, supra note 116, at 1100.
126. Thus, the "reform" of rape into a graded assault-based crime, which is sup-
posed to "reaffirm that all citizens are equal under the law," (Schwartz & Clear, Toward
a New Law on Rape, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 129, 136 (1980)) ties gradation of rape, not
to the seriousness of the rape (can women be raped "a little"?), but to the willingness of
the victim to risk bodily injury. Giacopassi & Wilkinson, Rape and the Devalued Victim,
9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 367, 375 & n.2 (1985).
127. Estrich, supra note 116, at 1100-01.
128. Id. at 1111.
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force, and define the latter solely in schoolboy terms."'12 9 The resis-
tance standard is interpreted through this idea of force: "[f]orce is
when he hits me; resistance is when I hit back.'1 30
It is unproblematic to inculpate a man on the basis of resistance
and concomitant force. It is equally unproblematic, in nonforce/
nonresistance cases, to inculpate him on the basis of an intent to
overcome the woman's will to resist. But where he is blamelessly un-
aware that he has overcome her will by force, he has not satisfied the
mens rea for rape.131
However, the resistance standard departs from these grounds and
treats nonforce/nonresistance cases under what is really a proximate
cause rubric, asking whether the defendant intended his actions to
overcome the will of a reasonable woman, or whether a reasonable
woman would have actually been overcome. 13 2 If the accused did not
intend to overcome the will of a reasonable woman through fear, and
the complainant actually was overcome, then the resistance standard
concludes that her unreasonableness is an independent intervening
cause which stands between the defendant's acts and the harm. The
cases do not talk in terms of causation; but their logic is that but for
the unreasonableness of this victim, a rape would not have occurred;
a reasonable woman would have resisted, and this unintending "rap-
ist" would have stopped.
To summarize Estrich's thesis: the schoolboy idea of force and the
proximate cause test combine to mark off a group of women who are
ipso facto rapable, and who deserve whatever harm flows from their
status. In so doing it ignores the issue of mens rea, shifting the re-
sponsibility for vigilance from men to women. It creates a world in
which men are allowed to act according to their expectations of sex-
ual access, protecting such expectations unless they attach to a wo-
man who is unafraid and willing to resist. As such, the difference
between the legitimate inference of mens rea from force and the ille-
gitimate exculpation of men on the basis of proximate cause consti-
tutes, in part, a denial of the sexual autonomy of women.
B. The Mistake-of-Fact Defense
The resistance standard enables courts to tie mens rea and the
victim's unwillingness to have sex into an easily ascertainable fact in
129. Id. at 1112.
130. Id. at 1105.
131. See id. at 1117-18.
132. See id. at 1118.
the world. Under it some courts have even gone as far as to suggest
that there is no mens rea for rape; that, in effect, without a valid
consent defense a man is strictly liable for sexual contact which
takes place under conditions of force.133 Of course this is nonsense.
Rape, like all of the other serious crimes against the person, has a
mental element, and by and large that element is intent. The actus
reus of rape is sexual contact with a woman when she is not con-
senting. The mens rea is intention to perform the actus reus; or, in-
tention to have sexual contact regardless of the woman's consent.3
Since performance of the core act (sexual contact) is virtually impos-
sible without intention (setting aside rare cases of physical compul-
sion), the focus of mens rea inquiry has been in regard to the attend-
ant circumstances - the woman's consent.
In D.P.P. v. Morgan,"5s the English House of Lords had to decide
whether a mistake of fact as to consent had to be both honest and
reasonable in order to act as a defense, or whether the mistake need
only be honest. This issue is equivalent to a debate about which
mens rea going to the attendant circumstance of victim's consent is
necessary for liability: recklessness or negligence. If you believe that
mistakes must be honest and reasonable, then you are imposing a
negligence mens rea with regard to consent. If you believe that hon-
esty alone will suffice to exculpate (as the Morgan court did), then
you are requiring a mens rea of recklessness (that is, you are assert-
ing that negligence with regard to consent is not sufficient for crimi-
nal liability).
When a defendant raises the mistake-of-fact defense, he concedes
133. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grant, 391 Mass. 645, 464 N.E.2d 33 (1984);
State v. Reed, 479 A.2d 1291 (Me. 1984); Commonwealth v. Williams, 294 Pa. Super.
93, 439 A.2d 765 (1982).
134. See A. KENNY, FREEWILL AND RESPONSIBILITY 57 (1978).
For reasons that are somewhat mysterious to me, George Fletcher disagrees. He asks
us to imagine a scale of contact in increasingly incriminating order: "touching"; "sexual
contact"; "forcible sexual contact"; and "non-consensual, forcible sexual contact."
Touching, he rightly argues, is too "routine" to serve as the basis of the actus reus of
rape; sexual contact is not. Thus, sexual contact requires a "good reason" to occur, anal-
ogous to tort principles which require the consent of a touchee or a medical emergency to
insure constructive consent. "This seems to me to be sufficient to regard the definition of
rape as sexual penetration, with consent functioning as a ground for regarding the sexual
act as a shared expression of love rather than as an invasion of bodily integrity." G.
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 705 (1978). Fletcher presumably is concluding
that consent is not an inculpatory fact, but an exculpatory one, part of the justification
for the actus reus, not its definition. See id. at 703. I think this is mere word-play, jump-
ing from "consent justifies sexual contact" (i.e., sexual contact is an individual decision,
not a social one) to "consent is a justification for rape." Fletcher even admits that con-
sent in this instance does not look like justificatory defenses generally: (a) Justifications
generally function as "exceptions to a prohibitory norm" (i.e., they represent lesser evils).
(b) They justify the imposition of regrettable harm. But consent to sexual contact "con-
verts the act into one of mutual benefit." Id. at 707.
135. [1975] 2 All E.R. 347.
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that the victim did not consent, and maintains that he was
nonculpably unaware of her nonconsent. He can be unaware in two
different ways. First, he might have been literally unaware of the
woman's actions which now raise the inference of her unwillingness
to have sex; that is, he never paid attention to them at all. Second,
he might have heeded those actions, but misunderstood the inference
of nonconsent they raise. This distinction does not serve as a proxy
for the negligent/reckless mens rea distinction. Neither kind of mis-
take necessarily involves, as Lord Halisham put it in Morgan, an
intent to have sexual contact "willy-nilly not caring whether the vic-
tim consents or no,"'136 thus establishing a mens rea of recklessness.
A defendant can be totally inattentive to the victim's acts because of
his a priori inference of her willingness drawn from the circum-
stances of their encounter, the history of their relationship, or even
from third-hand accounts of her reputation. Such inferences can be
made negligently or recklessly. Likewise, these kinds of inferences
might color the scope of his inadvertence or the conclusions he draws
from her acts; these too may be negligent or reckless.137 The Morgan
rule holds that neither kind of negligent mistake as to consent is con-
sistent with criminal liability for rape.
The debate over the exculpatory effects of unreasonable mistake is
a debate over whether the unreasonableness of the mistake justifies
relating the defendant's mental state to an intentional failure to no-
tice (Lord Halisham's "willy-nilly" intention).' 38 The defendant who
is truly negligently mistaken has the intention to engage in inter-
course subject to the factual belief that his partner is consenting.
The intentionally inadvertent defendant, however, has a compound
conditional intent which runs something like this: "'[I]f she con-
sents, I will have intercourse with her' and '[I]f she does not consent,
I will have intercourse with her.' ""' The difference between these
two defendants is that the mistaken one might alter his actions when
he alters his belief about consent. 4 ° If, in a particular instance, he
136. [1975] 2 All E.R. at 362.
137. See H.L.A. HART, Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal Responsibility, in
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 136, 146-49
(1968) (arguing that negligence is not mere inadvertence to risk).
138. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
139. A. KENNY, supra note 134, at 61.
140. In other words, the intention to proceed to have sex under (relatively) ambiv-
alent circumstances is an action which is distinct from mis- or in-advertence to a wo-
man's willingness. It is the act of proceeding under ambivalent conditions, not the act of
mistaken apprehension, which merits punishment. Such a "disjoined view" of negligent
rape is necessary to maintain its criminal character. See Kelman, Interpretive Construc-
would not have altered his simple intention, then his honest belief in
consent does not negate the inference of intentional inadvertence
which the twin facts (1) that the rape occurred, and (2) that he can
offer no consent defense, raise. How do we come to judge whether he
would have altered his simple intention? Aside from the defendant's
own claims about his mental state, we are left only with a reasona-
bleness inquiry. 1" If the mistake was reasonable, then there is no
reason to believe that the defendant intended to ignore his victim's
consent acts. If it was not, there is no reason to believe that he did
not intend to proceed "willy-nilly." This inference - from reasona-
bleness of mistake to intention to be inadvertent - is the crux of the
debate over the unreasonable mistake defense. If you believe that
reasonableness can be unproblematically used in this way, then you
are making a moral judgment that one who is negligently mistaken
is nearly as deserving of punishment as one who is intentionally inad-
vertent, and you are concluding that an unreasonable mistake of fact
does not negate an inference of intentional inadvertence.'42
The various kinds of weak consequentialist justifications which can
be made to support this use of reasonableness inquiry, such as a
heightened deterrent effect which will follow from the greater likeli-
hood of conviction, or the need to provide an outlet for retributive
urges which would accrue if unreasonable mistakes could exculpate
rapists, 143 are of relatively little value in assessing its justness. The
crux of this debate must take place over the issue of desert. But we
must bear in mind that it is a particular kind of desert. Mistake -
even reasonable mistake - exculpates only in cases where it has
been proven that sexual contact did take place, and that the victim
was not consenting. The defendant found innocent under this defense
is not innocent in the same way as someone who was mistakenly
identified as the perpetrator, or as someone who establishes a consent
defense. The "innocence" of the misadvertent defendant is the inno-
cence of someone who does not, all things considered, deserve to suf-
fer the effects of punishment (that is, suffer the penalty); but this
defendant might still deserve to be branded a criminal, and have his
actions judged to be a crime. 44 As such, it is not the kind of inno-
tion in Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591, 626 n.94 (1981).
141. "Reasonableness" would not require a man to be a good reader of a woman's
willingness to have sex; but it would require that he be sensitive to the ambiguities of
sexual communication, and take care to insure that he does not presume consent from
near silence ("silence" referring both to verbal silence and behavioral passivity). See
Wiener, Shifting the Communication Burden: A Meaningful Consent Standard in Rape,
6 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 143, 146-49, 158-61 (1983).
142. This is essentially the argument that Anthony Kenny uses to criticize the
Morgan rule, although he couches it in different terms. See A. KENNY, supra note 134,
at 61-62.
143. Curley, supra note 98, at 343.
144. See L. KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS: CONUNDRUMS OF THE CRIMI-
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cence that by right exempts the actor from liability; it is a kind
which we may justifiably alter in accord with our moral sensibili-
ties.145 In terms of Ronald Dworkin's famous distinction between
principles and policies, 146 the "innocence" of such a defendant does
not exculpate him on principle (unlike the misidentified accused), it
exculpates on the basis of a policy to give it that effect; as such, it is
rightfully subject to change under a consequentialist rubric (such as
deterrence).
The classic argument against criminal liability for negligent acts
- that it amounts to odious strict liability for crimes1 47 - would
deny that the Morgan court faced a "policy" choice at all. Rather,
the Morgan court could have argued that a man who was unreasona-
bly mistaken about his partner's consent could not (because he, un-
like the reasonable man, did not) anticipate that his partner was un-
willing to have sex with him. If he could anticipate her
unwillingness, but was unreasonably mistaken, then he intended to
have sex regardless of her willingness. Thus, the negligence mens rea
for rape, like negligence liability for crimes generally, will unfairly
inculpate a man who either lacks the capacity, or the opportunity, to
arrive at a reasonable conclusion concerning his partner's willingness
to have sex.1 48
H.L.A. Hart demonstrates how these arguments are clearly
wrong. They presume a simplistic and unpersuasive account of the
relationship between knowledge and action. In their view, knowledge
of the consequences of one's actions is a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for assuming responsibility for those actions, and, inversely,
not having such knowledge bars responsibility because one could not
have acted otherwise.1 49 In other words, proponents of these argu-
ments think of the word "negligence" as the description of a state of
mind which is largely synonymous with the word "inadvertent."150
Hart, on the other hand, treats the word "negligence" to denote a
moral judgment which encompasses both a characterization of its
object's mental state - inadvertence - and its object's blamewor-
NAL LAW 27-29 (1987) (contrasting "punishment" with "penalty").
145. Curley, supra note 98, at 344-45.
146. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90-100 (1977).
147. See, e.g., Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L.
REV. 731, 741-45 (1960).
148. See, e.g., J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 133-41, 369-72(2d ed. 1960); G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 43 (2d ed. 1960).
149. H.L.A. HART, supra note 137, at 150.
150. Id. at 146.
thiness for this mental state:
[A] careful consideration is needed of the differences between the meaning
of expressions like 'inadvertently' and 'while his mind was a blank' on the
one hand, and 'negligently' on the other. . . . [I]f we say of that person
that he has acted negligently we are not thereby merely describing the
frame of mind in which he acted . ... [W]e are referring to the fact that
the agent failed to comply with a standard of conduct with which an ordi-
narily reasonable man could and would have complied. . . . Through our
negligence in not examining the situation before acting or in attending to it
as we act, we may fail to realize the possible harmful consequences of what
we are doing and as to these our mind is in a sense a 'blank'; but the negli-
gence does not, of course, consist in this blank state of mind but in our
failure to take precautions against the harm by examining the situation. 151
When we punish the negligent rapist, we are punishing him for fail-
ing to take appropriate efforts to discover whether his partner is will-
ing to have sex - and for letting her bear the risk of error.152 I am
not, therefore, arguing that it is always just to punish negligence
with criminal penalties. I am advocating criminal liability where
negligence is generated by (or, characterized as) a lack of respect for
others. It is the unexcusable violation of the principle of respect for
persons manifested as negligence, not negligence as such, which jus-
tifies, on retributive grounds, criminal stigma and penalty.153 There
will certainly be men who are unable to exercise care because they
lack the capacity. And such men will not deserve to be punished in
accord with a relentlessly objective standard of reasonable behavior.
But they do not compel us to abandon the requirement that mistakes
as to consent be reasonable; they only require that we weigh their
subjective capacities to live up to the objective standard versus their
actual shortfall (that is, reject an objective standard of
reasonableness) .154
Is it possible that a man who is capable of examining his partner's
willingness to have sex might not, under the circumstances, have an
opportunity to do so? If it is, then a man who blamelessly fails to
exercise due care could be held liable for rape under the negligence
mens rea. But I do not see how this is possible. Reasonable, even
careful, attention to a woman's willingness to have sex is easy: (1)
the man's attention ought to (and in most cases is) directed toward
this fact (consent); (2) the fact requires a fairly simple inquiry; and
(3) the woman is immediately present in all cases. All he need do is
ask her. If her answer is equivocal, he can wait and/or ask for clari-
fication. Unless she is actively noncommittal, or totally contradic-
151. Id. at 147-48 (emphasis in original).
152. Estrich, supra note 116, at 1103; Pickard, Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Re-
lating Mens Rea to the Crime, 30 U. TORONTo L.J. 75, 83 (1980); see also H.L.A.
HART, supra note 137, at 150-51.
153. Thornton, Rape and Mens Rea, 8 CAN. J. PHIL. SUPP. 119, 132 (1982).
154. Pickard, supra note 152, at 79.
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tory, the fault for misadvertence is much more likely to be his fault
than hers. 15
It seems to me ridiculous to argue that it is hard for a man to
reasonably and carefully pay attention to his partner's willingness to
have sex with him, unless what is meant by "hard" is that such at-
tention is detrimental to a man's interests. If he expects consent,
then the exercise of due care, and his partner's concomitant opportu-
nity to frustrate these expectations by voicing unwillingness (with-
holding consent), represent a threat to even "reasonable" expecta-
tions of sexual access. The "cost" of reasonable advertence rises in
proportion to the strength of the expectations. To argue that to care-
fully pay attention is "too hard," or that the defendant had "no op-
portunity," is, generally speaking, to weigh the cost of inquiry (detri-
ment to expectations of sexual access) over the harm of rape.'56 To
refuse to require that mistakes be reasonable before they exculpate a
man from rape (as the Morgan court did) is to presume the justness
of enforcing, through a right of self-help, reasonable expectations of
sexual access.
C. The Role of Expectations
The status of the Morgan rule in the United States is uncertain.
Although the issue of a mistake-of-fact defense in toto is being
raised increasingly157 there is no consensus on the validity of the rea-
sonableness inquiry. People v. Mayberry,158 perhaps the leading
American case on the subject, 159 firmly establishes a negligence
mens rea with regard to consent. Only one state - and that by a
lower court decision - has come firmly down on the side of Morgan.
But the seductiveness of the reasoning used in this case raises the
risk that other states may follow suit, leaving Mayberry behind.
Reynolds v. State'60 involved a fairly typical date rape. Reynolds
brought one J.D. back to his apartment, instead of driving her home
155. Id. at 81.
156. Thornton, supra note 153, at 132.
157. See Comment, Culpable Mistakes in Rape: Eliminating the Defense of Un-
reasonable Mistake of Fact As to Victim Consent, 89 DICK. L. REv. 473, 481 & n.40
(1985).
158. 15 Cal. 3d 143, 155, 542 P.2d 1337, 1345, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745, 753 (1975).
159. I conclude that it is the leading American case on the basis of its inclusion in
Sanford Kadish's widely-read and influential casebook on criminal law. S. KADISH, S.
SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 293-96 (4th ed. 1983).
160. 664 P.2d 621 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
as she requested, at the end of an evening outing. He forced her to
enter; after she did, he locked the deadbolt on the door and removed
the key. She protested verbally to his sexual overtures, but did not
physically resist because there was a handgun sitting in the open in
Reynolds' room. He interpreted his actions as pure seduction, and
perceived nothing in her behavior which would indicate willing-
ness."'1 The substance of his appeal was that Alaska's first degree
rape statute, and the jury instructions issued under it, were unconsti-
tutional because they held him strictly liable for J.D.'s lack of con-
sent. The court disagreed, holding that the instructions correctly re-
flected Alaska law which required recklessness as to the victim's
nonconsent16 2 It is the court's explanation of why recklessness must
be shown that is dangerously seductive.
The Court reasoned that rape was once a "general intent" crime.
The actus reus was intercourse with a nonconsenting woman. But
nonconsent had to be established by reference to resistance and the
concomitant force necessary to complete the underlying act - inter-
course - over the resistance. This requirement of resistance, usually
utmost resistance, served to mitigate the "potential harshness" of a
rule which made the defendant, in effect, strictly liable for the com-
plainant's lack of consent.16 3 It is this theory which allows some
courts to define the actus reus of rape as forcible intercourse and
conclude that there is no mens rea at all.164 But the utmost resis-
tance standard has been softened in recent years, thus "increasing
the risk that a jury might convict a defendant under circumstances
where lack of consent was ambiguous. 165 To "counteract" such a
risk, courts have had to recognize a defense of reasonable mistake-
of-fact as to consent - Mayberry being the leading example of this
response."'6 Reynolds diverges from Mayberry, however, because
Alaska's resistance standard diverges from California's. Alaska has
no resistance standard: "'without consent' means that a person...
with or without resisting, is coerced by use of force . . . or by ex-
press or implied threat of imminent physical death ...injury, or
• ..kidnapping.1167 This elimination shifts "the focus of the jury's
attention from the victim's resistance or actions to the defendant's
understanding of the totality of circumstances."' 68 In order to pro-
tect the defendant from conviction when "the circumstances regard-
ing consent are ambiguous" the prosecution must establish reckless-
161. Id. at 622-23.
162. Id. at 627-28.
163. Id. at 623.
164. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
165. 664 P.2d at 624.
166. Id.
167. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(3)(A) (1983) (emphasis supplied).
168. 664 P.2d at 625.
[VOL. 26: 21, 1989] Law of Forcible Rape
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
ness as to nonconsent. 16
9
Reynolds reveals the foundational presence of the enforcement of
expectations of sexual access in the construction of the rapist. A man
exercising his right of self-help under the principle of enforcement
will be able to defend himself against a rape charge by pointing ei-
ther to his partner's failure to offer reasonable physical resistance (in
a Mayberry-type jurisdiction) or his honest (albeit mistaken) belief
in consent (in a Reynolds-type jurisdiction). She will not have re-
sisted because, by definition, exercise of the right of self-help is in-
compatible with force sufficient to overcome resistance (marital rape
is an exception here, where the expectation is so strong, even force is
permitted in the exercise of self-help). His belief in consent will be
honest because holding reasonable expectations of access is incom-
patible with vigorously-voiced unwillingness or resistance.
Aside from the construction of the rape victim as a woman who is
not subject (as a wife, lover, or companion) to reasonable expecta-
tions of sexual access lies a construction of the rapist as a man who
intends to have sex with women for whom his expectation of sexual
access is unreasonable. It is possible to think of the marital exemp-
tion and the conduct-with-accused exception to rape evidence rules
as particular applications of this more basic construct of the rapist.
Is this construction of the rapist a particular application of a yet
more basic construct? M.T. Thornton suggests that it is:
Surely a man should take care to find out whether or not a woman is con-
senting? If her role were simply to gratify the man's desires, the situation
would be different. In that case violating a woman's body would be like
damaging her property, where an honest albeit unreasonable belief negates
mens rea. To require that belief in the woman's consent be both honest and
reasonable is to require that the man treat the woman as an equal partner
in sexual intercourse.170
I will explore this yet-more-basic construct next.
IV. EXPECTATION AND DESIRE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RAPE
Up to now this article has been concerned with describing the law
of rape - with telling a story which renders coherent seemingly dis-
parate features of the substantive law of rape. The "story" which
makes these features of rape law coherent (or, in other words, the
underlying normative structure of the law) explains that the law of
169. Id.
170. Thornton, supra note 153, at 142.
rape does not respond to instahces where unwilling women are co-
erced into having sex with men who hold reasonable expectations of
sexual access, which men are privileged to use means of self-help to
enforce their expectations. Women enter into sexual contracts with
men, which the law largely respects and, by immunizing men from
state interference when they undertake "reasonable" means of self-
help, renders enforceable. In this respect the law of forcible rape is
one of many institutions which enforce what Carole Pateman calls
the "law of male sex-right" - the "demand that women's bodies, in
the flesh and in representation, should be publicly available to
them."171
While feminist scholarship has had little difficulty seeing with
clarity the ways in which the "law of male sex-right" shapes the law
of rape, 7 12 it remains perplexed about the link between male atti-
tudes and the sexual access the law protects. 17 13 This link is impor-
tant. With an understanding of the link, it becomes possible to think
about rape law as a possible vehicle for the elimination of sexual
coercion, and a means of liberation. Without it, rape law remains an
object of reformist tinkering, because it appears to be little more
than an automatic reflection of the biased attitudes of the men
judges, lawyers, police officers - who inhabit it.174
To find that link, I will argue, you have to look at some of the
ways in which men in our society are socialized to desire women.
Men are socialized 7 5 to desire women in such a way that the desired
woman's own desire for the desirer is irrelevant. It is certainly im-
portant as a circumstance which either facilitates or hinders the sat-
isfaction of desire, but it plays little role in the formation of the de-
sire. Desire is thus experienced as wholly individualized, part of the
very same autonomous self which makes bargains and seeks to have
expectations enforced.
To illustrate this link, I shall compare three groups of men: (1)
normal ones, who have not raped, but who can, under the right con-
ditions, contemplate and appreciate rape; (2) prison-population rap-
ists, who have raped and know they have raped; and (3) date rapists,
who have raped and are not (completely) sure if they have. The
171. C. PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 14 (1988).
172. See, e.g., S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 71 (1987).
173. See Henderson, supra note 64, at 197-98.
174. Hence the limitations of the liberal feminist critique of rape law, which
misses the underlying moral structure of rape law and sees only the individual actors who
act out this moral structure. Katz, supra note 21, at 1014-17.
175. Arguing toward such broad generalization is an enterprise fraught with dan-
ger, Not every man experiences desire in this way, and not every one who does so exper-
iences it to the same degree. Although I do believe that it is an accurate (albeit partial)
description of the nature of male desire, I do not suggest that it is truly natural for men
to experience their desire in this way.
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common thread which unites these groups of men is not any kind of
social or psychlogical pathology, but a moral flaw. For them sexual
desire is not necessarily something which is to be shared with a will-
ing partner. It is instead something to be subjectively satisfied. These
men look very much like mis- or nonadvertent actors discussed in the
prior part of this article: they proceed to have sex "willy-nilly not
caring whether [she] consents or not.' 7 6
A. The "'Sickness" of Rapists
One of the standard myths of rape is that "All rapists are sick." If
the accused did "sick" things to the complainant (viz. actions which
are not considered acceptable in the normal conversation or seduc-
tion process) - if he beat her, or jumped her, or made her perform
unusual acts - it was fairly easy to convict him. But if the accused
appeared normal, was respectable, had more-or-less conventional sex
with the complainant, he was not "sick" and ipso facto not a rapist.
If it could be shown that the complainant was the "sick" one -
because of her unusual, risky, or sexualized lifestyle-then he was in
even better shape. In the early days of "scientific" rape jurispru-
dence, much effort was expended in trying to discover how to iden-
tify the sick, and hence lying, complainant. 177 (Race was used in a
similar way.) 178 I would like to examine the rebuttal of this myth.
W.L. Marshall and H.E. Barbaree have proposed a behavioral
model of rape which destroys the myth of sickness.' 9 It distinguishes
rapists and nonrapists by their inability to inhibit sexual arousal
when sexual depictions sufficient to generate arousal are mixed with
indications of force or nonconsent which usually inhibit such
arousal.' 8 0 This does not mean that rapists prefer forced or noncon-
176. Reg. v. Morgan (H.L.), [1976] App. Cas. 192, 215 (1976).
177. See 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924a, at 736-37 (Chad. rev. ed. 1970);
Note, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CH. L. REV. 613, 626
(1976).
178. The myth of the sick rapist says that no one is capable of rape, save the rare
maniac. Therefore, a normal man having normal sex with a woman cannot be raping her.
The myth of the black man's sexual potency struck such fear and envy in white hearts
that every black man was deemed not only capable of raping a white woman, but actu-
ally desirous of so doing. Therefore, a black man having sex with a white woman must be
raping her. For a discussion of rape and racism, see Hall, "The Mind that Burns in Each
Body". Women, Rape and Racial Violence, in POWERS OF DESIRE, supra note 15, at 328;
Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 103 (1983).
179. Marshall & Barbaree, A Behavorial View of Rape, 7 INT'L J.L. & PSYCH. 51
(1984).
180. Id. at 56-57.
sensual sex. It means that, for instance, if you show men two differ-
ent films with the same erotic content - the same sexual "cues," in
the same order, and with the same timing - rapists are distin-
guished from other men by the fact that they will be aroused, and
other men will not, notwithstanding additional cues of force or non-
consent.181 It is not that sexualized force turns rapists on; it is that
forced sexuality fails to turn them off.
Measures of "normal" (nonrapist) men's sexual response to mixed
depictions of sexuality and nonconsent/force have repeatedly indi-
cated that there are a number of disinhibitory factors whose pres-
ence leads to a heightened sexual response to rape depictions. Men
who are (1) intoxicated, (2) angry at a woman, (3) sexually aroused
prior to exposure to the rape depiction, (4) told by an authority fig-
ure that arousal to rape is "normal," or (5) subjected to a rape de-
piction in which the victim becomes aroused, show a greater arousal
response (measured in terms of penile tumescence) than men who
are confronted with the same depictions without the disinhibitory
influences.'8 2
Diana Scully and Joseph Marolla have studied the rapist prison
population, asking these men how they viewed their crime, what
their explanation of it was, and how their account differed from the
one which society (or, the law) gave of it.'8 a A number of themes
emerged as these men attempted to excuse, justify, or describe the
motivations for their actions: (1) Many attempted to excuse them-
selves by claiming that they were under the influence of alcohol or
drugs. Curiously, they often also claimed that the victim was also
under the influence, and hence more "responsible" for the harm than
was perceived.18 4 (2) The crime was blamed on prior emotional
trauma. Very often that trauma was proximate to the rape (com-
monly, the rapists were enraged over something connected to a
women they loved); but more distant emotional trauma, including an
unhappy or unstable childhood, was also cited to excuse the rape.
Further, some rapists tried to present a "nice guy" image, attempt-
ing to pass off the rape as an inexplicable and transitory wrongdo-
ing. 8 5 (3) The rape was seen as a way to punish or avenge some
wrong. The victim could be a random token of some other woman, a
token of women generally, or the rapist's specific antagonist. Victims
were transformed into antagonists when the rapist seized upon some
181. Id. at 66.
182. Id. at 57.
183. Scully & Marolla, 'Riding the Bull at Gilley's'. Convicted Rapists Describe
the Rewards of Rape, 32 Soc. PROBS. 251 (1985) [hereinafter Rewards of Rape]; Scully
& Marolla, Convicted Rapists' Vocabulary of Motive: Excuses and Justifications, 31
Soc, PROBS. 530 (1984) [hereinafter Excuses and Justifications].
184. Excuses and Justifications, supra note 183, at 538-39.
185. Id. at 539-41.
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action which occurred after the rape had begun to stand for the
more general retributive motivation. 18 6 (4) Some rapists explained
that they preferred the power which rape gave them over mutually
consensual sex, enjoyed the sense of adventure, or experienced ele-
vated self-esteem after the rape. 187 As one interviewee put it, "After
rape, I always felt like I had just conquered something, like I had
just ridden the bull at Gilley's."' 88 Others saw the rape as an "added
bonus" to a crime (typically burglary and robbery) over which they
had significant control.18 9 (5) The victim was depicted as the aggres-
sor in the encounter, a seductress who demanded the rapist's per-
formance.1 90 (6) Some explained that their actions were a way to
achieve a sexual access to which they felt entitled.' 91 (7) Many at-
tempted to excuse their actions by describing the victim as a gener-
ally disreputable person, on the presumption that "nice girls don't
get raped."' 92 (8) Particularly among younger men convicted for
gang rapes, the rape was explained as an exercise in male bonding, a
way to prove one's self and experience adventure. These men fre-
quently claim that they practiced gang rape regularly, but only with
women who were "known" to enjoy such activities. 93 Many of the
rapists studied were convinced that their victim enjoyed the rape;
even if the victim objected at first, she eventually relaxed and began
to enjoy the act.9 (10) Finally, many also claim that the victim,
and women generally, really mean "yes" when they say "no" - that
some initial force was a necessary overture to sex without which the
woman could not enjoy herself. 95
The parallels between the disinhibitory factors found among "nor-
mal" males and the justifications, excuses, and explanations offered
by convicted rapists (summarized in Table 1)196 provide striking con-
firmation of Marshall & Barbaree's thesis that what rapists "suffer
from" is a failure to disinhibit sexual response under coercive or
forceful conditions. The question remains, why?
A number of social inadequacies are found among rapists. They
186. Rewards of Rape, supra note 183, at 255-57.
187. Id. at 259-61.
188. Id. at 261.
189. Id. at 257.
190. Excuses and Justifications, supra note 183, at 534.
191. Rewards of Rape, supra note 183, at 257-59.
192. Excuses and Justifications, supra note 183, at 536-37.
193. Rewards of Rape, supra note 183, at 259-60.
194. Excuses and Justifications, supra note 183, at 535-36.
195. Id. at 534-35.
196. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
are all associated with a manifestly negative attitude toward women,
which is itself a strong disinhibitory factor. (1) They are unable to
satisfactorily manage their lives, work, and leisure; they are often
substance abusers, and generally stressed by the relative boredom of
their lives. (2) They exhibit a general lack of regard for others:
"such individuals fail to acquire the social prohibitions which pre-
vent most people from abusing the rights of others and from interfer-
ing with the personal integrity of others. ' 197 (3) They are poor in
relationship-building and -sustaining skills. (4) Their sexual knowl-
edge can be limited, and they are often prudish and anxious about
their masculinity. (5) Rapists possess poor conversational skills, par-
ticularly when it comes to conversation with women.198
B. Normal Desire
Compare these functional inadequacies, which were found among
prison-population rapists, with the statement of Jay, a perfectly ordi-
nary twenty-three-year-old, discussing his attitudes toward rape:
Let's say I see a woman and she looks really pretty and really clean and
sexy, and she's giving off very feminine, sexy vibes. I think, "Wow, I would
love to make love to her," but I know she's not really interested. It's a tease.
A lot of times a woman knows that she's looking really good and she'll use
that and flaunt it, and it makes me feel like she's laughing at me and I feel
degraded.
I also feel dehumanized, because when I'm being teased I just turn off, I
cease to be human. Because if I go with my human emotions I'm going to
want to put my arms around her and kiss her, and to do that would be
unacceptable. I don't like the feeling that I'm supposed to stand there and
take it, and not be able to hug her or kiss her; so I just turn off my feelings
and react in a way that I really don't want to.
If I were actually desperate enough to rape somebody, it would be from
wanting the person, but also it would be a very spiteful thing, just being
able to say, "I have power over you and I can do anything' I want with
you," because really I feel that they have power over me just by their pres-
ence. Just the fact that they can come up to me and just melt me and make
me feel like a dummy makes me want revenge. They have power over me so
I want power over them ....
Society says that you have to have a lot of sex with a lot of different
women to be a real man. Well, what happens if you don't? Then what are
you? Are you half a man? Are you still a boy? It's ridiculous. You see a
whisky ad with a guy and two women on his arm. The implication is that
real men don't have any trouble getting women.199
This example shows how quickly desire and expectation can get
bound up with frustration and anger. Jay is not on the whole a func-
tionally-impaired person. While we can interpret his statement in
light of the categories of dysfunction proposed by Marshall &
Barbaree, and even conclude that Jay could use some improvement
197. Marshall & Barbaree, supra note 179, at 61.
198. Id. at 58-61.
199. T. BENEKE, MEN ON RAPE 43-44 (1982) (emphasis and ellipses in Original).
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in some of them, we cannot conclude that he is anything but an aver-
age functioning person; nor can we conclude that his statement is
unrepresentative of men. Yet Jay is certainly a potential rapist. How
long will it be before his frustration at feeling controlled, "dehuman-
ized," will erupt in the determination that "Now am doing the con-
trolling?" How long will it be before he feels the need to acquit his
self-esteem before the ideal of the whisky ad by letting his expecta-
tions in a date run ahead of his willingness to pay heed to the desires
of his companion? If his desire at the sight of a "sexy" woman runs
directly into its negation without the interposition of a desire that
she want him, can we be sure that Jay will ever do well at con-
forming his sexual conduct to his companion's willingness? He ex-
hibits a great deal of frustration at the idea that this sexy woman's
unwillingness runs against his desires and expectations. The line be-
tween men who have raped and those who have not is a flimsy one
- maybe as flimsy as the line between those who were caught (or
realized) and those who have not.200
From the rapist's failure to disinhibit his arousal to rape, Marshall
& Barbaree reason that there is a baseline "biological tendency to
respond to coercive sex which is ordinarily under the control of ac-
quired constraints but can be released by certain conditions." 0' 1
Whether men are exposed to a tug-of-war between a biological urge
to rape and cultural imperative to refrain, or whether they are sub-
ject to dissonant cultural demands,20 2 one to rape and one not to,
makes little normative difference. For this discussion it is important
to see the fundamental fact that men generally experience an urge to
rape - to take out their sexual desires/expectations regardless of
their partner's willingness - and that most men manage to check
this urge through inhibitory mechanisms. Rapists do not check this
urge because they lack certain kinds of functional skills. It would be
a mistake, however, to think that rapists fall short of a baseline level
of functioning. Rather, these functional skills mark dimensions of
treatment and comprehension of a complex (and perhaps over-deter-
200. There is a great deal of similarity between the attitudes of rapists toward
women and the attitudes of non-rapists who report that they would likely rape if they
could avoid punishment. Malamuth, Rape Proclivity Among Males, 37:4 J. Soc. IssuEs
138 (Fall 1981).
201. Marshall & Barbaree, supra note 179, at 67.
202. Cross-cultural studies of rape indicate that this second conflict is more likely
to be the real one. See Sanday, Rape and the Silencing of the Feminine, in RAPE 84 (S.
Tomaselli & R. Porter eds. 1986); Sanday, The Socio-Cultural Context of Rape: A
Cross-Cultural Study, 37:4 J. Soc. IssuEs 5 (Fall 1981).
mined) behavior. These skills, if improved upon, most fruitfully en-
able rapists to regain the upper hand on the urge to rape. But many
men whose function is as "impaired" as rapists do not rape.203
Pornography is the one social institution which is most strongly
associated with the failure to inhibit sexual response to rape depic-
tions. 04 Marshall & Barbaree argue that a permissive posture to-
ward pornography - especially in a time when all pornography is
getting more violent - plays the social analogy to the laboratory
disinhibiting factor of authoritative assurance that disinhibition is
"normal." They conclude that "lax attitudes toward the availability
of pornography . . . legitimizes the possibility of forced sex
.... ,205 Feminists have always understood this. Before any of the
studies upon which Marshall & Barbaree rely were published, Robin
Morgan wrote: "Pornography is the theory, and rape is the
practice. 208
We can better understand the relationship of pornography to rape
if we understand the relationship between pornographizing and rape.
"Pornographizing" is, writes Timothy Beneke,
the process by which men relate to women, images of women, the visual
presence of women, stories about women, women in any way as PORNEA,
which is Greek for "low whore." How does one relate to a low whore? As
property one uses for "sexual" pleasure. In pornographizing, one
anonymises the woman and fails to acknowledge her moral, spiritual, or
emotional being. One relates to her as a thing without a soul. The woman
as locus of experience is denied. And often, one relates to her body as a
fetish. A fetish: the new pair of shoes you stare and stare at that won't quite
give you what you want. The new watch that shines in the dark but some-
how leaves you empty. The thighs, breasts, calves, rears or women searched
for through your adolescence. Images savored and extorted for lust.
Pornographizing is the perceptual counterpart to sex as achievement of pos-
session of a commodity and sex as aggressive degradation. 0 7
Pornography as a cultural institution is the chief product of
pornographizing as a cultural process; it teaches how to
pornographize, sustains our efforts, and draws its strength from our
practices.20 8 Pornographizing sustains men's participation in the
203. "It is important to realize that all rapists will not necessarily suffer all these
deficiencies, but rather that the social factors we will mention describe a presumably
incomplete list of the possible defects in need of correction if we are to effectively treat
rapists." Marshall & Barbaree, supra note 179, at 58.
204. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
205. See Marshall & Barbarce, supra note 179, at 71 (emphasis supplied). See
also Donnerstein, et. al., Pornography and the First Amendment: What Does the Social
Science Research Say?, 4 LAW & INEQUALITY 17, 17-27 (1986); McCarthy, Pornogra-
phy, Rape, and the Cult of the Macho, HUMANIST I1 (Sept.-Oct. 1980); Zillmann &
Bryant, Pornography, Sexual Callousness, and the Trivialization of Rape, 32:4 J.
COMM. 10 (Autumn 1982).
206. Morgan, Theory and Practice: Pornography and Rape, in TAKE BACK THE
NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY 134, 139 (L. Lederer ed. 1980).
207. T. BENEKE, supra note 199, at 2324.
208. See A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981); S. GRIF-
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arousal/expectation/frustration cycle that Jay described earlier-a
cycle which never acknowledges as one of its terms whether the ob-
ject of desire desires the beholder.
Let us now look at the relationship between pornographizing and
rape in the absence of social dysfunction. Marshall & Barbaree's so-
cial dysfunction conception was derived from studies done on rapists
in the prison population or somewhere in the criminal justice system.
Such rapists will share much of their dysfunction with the prison
population as a whole.20 9 The kinds of subjects used to discover the
"normal" inhibitory response to coercive sex depictions are not
highly dysfunctional to begin with (they are usually college stu-
dents), but they are also not rapists. In comparison to them, the
prison-population rapists may over-exaggerate the connection be-
tween dysfunction and disinhibition. It would be immensely useful to
examine a third group whose social functioning is little different
from the "normal" men, yet who, like the prison population, have
actually raped.
Eugene Kanin studied a group of seventy-one self-reported rap-
ists.210 All were white middle-class university undergraduates with
no history of violence, who, on a date, had accomplished sexual pene-
tration by force on a nonconsenting female.211 In comparison with a
control group of unmarried university undergraduates, these rapists
appeared to be subject to a longstanding and "highly erotic peer
group socialization" process by which sexual performance became
"intimately associated with their feelings of worth." '212 They were
"dramatically" more sexually active than the controls, yet also "sig-
nificantly more apt to evaluate their sexual achievements as unsatis-
factory." 13 They are most strikingly like Jay, in that they are
FIN, PORNOGRAPHY AND SILENCE: CULTURE'S REVENGE AGAINST NATURE (1981).
209. For instance, substance abuse, linked to poor life management skills, is one of
the social inadequacies found among prison population rapists. See supra note 198 and
accompanying text. But substance abuse levels are not significantly higher for rapists
than for other felons. Ladouceur & Temple, Substance Use Among Rapists: A Compari-
son with Other Serious Felons, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 269 (1985).
210. Kanin, Date Rape: Unofficial Criminals and Victims, 9 VICTIMOLOGY 95
(1984).
211. Id. at 96, 98. Kanin excluded from his sample 15 cases which did not un-
equivocally present the mens rea of rape. Seven cases involved an initial episode of force
giving way to receptive cooperation where there was a long-term relationship between the
victim and her rapist; in five cases the victim was so "literally immobilized with fear"
that she was purely passive. And three cases were not included because the respondent
decided to terminate the interview. Id. at 97.
212. Id. at 98.
213. Id. at 99.
caught up in a desire/expectation/frustration cycle with women.
Kanin suggests that
It is inevitable that a socialization process which produces high levels of
sexual aspiration will also result in these men being highly vulnerable to
relative sexual frustration, that is, a frustration resulting from their sexual
accomplishments falling short of the lofty and often elusive aspiration levels
introjected from their erotic-oriented peers.21 4
Several characteristics marked the encounter which ended in rape.
The rapists did not plan their act; rather, they hoped that seduction
would lead to consensual sex. Consensual foreplay preceded the rape,
and this foreplay was often linked to some kind of consensual sexual
contact on previous occasions. Two-thirds of the rapists were intoxi-
cated; nearly all of these attempted to excuse their conduct to some
degree on this fact. There was a high degree of expectation of sexual
access or accomplishment present which simply caused the men to
exaggerate their perception of the woman's willingness and to ignore
contrary indications. Sixty-eight percent of the women, for instance,
expressly stipulated that foreplay was the limit of their willingness to
sexual contact. The sexual arousal which proceeded from this con-
sensual sexual contact was interpreted by the men as willingness to
engage in intercourse. Resistance was taken to be a sign of conven-
tional morality, not a serious expression of unwillingness. 21a The rape
itself was not accomplished angrily, but it was accomplished force-
fully - "mismatched wrestling contests" are what Kanin called
them. 16 In the initial stages of the rape itself the woman was not
able to perceive herself as a victim, and the "vast majority" resisted
at first. As the rapist became more insistent, however, the "aura of
danger" led many victims to cease resistance. Thus, the rapists per-
ceived the truth of their expectant assumptions in the rapid denoue-
ment from resistance to compliance. 1 Penetration was accom-
plished because the rapists were (perhaps unwittingly) able to
project a threat of force sufficient to overcome resistance.218
These rapists are not dysfunctional like their prison counterparts;
but they are pornographizers. They desire (a purely subjective con-
cept) their sexual partners; they also expect (an objective form of
desire) that such access will be forthcoming, and act in accord with
this expectation. In light of their expectations they skew their inter-
pretation of her behavior until she mirrors their own willingness to
214. Id. at 98-99.
215. Id. at 98-101.
216. Id. at 101.
217. Id. at 101-02.
218. "Put simply, a substantial number of these rapes occurred because the 'right
man' (sexually aggressive and determined) did the 'right thing' (presented a level of
force not usually encountered in dating) to the 'right girl' (easily frightened or inebri-
ated)." Id. at 102.
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have sex. The prison rapists, as we can see from the work of Scully
& Marolla, are also pornographizers. They skew the victim's volun-
tariness and think they are justified in exacting their own ends
(power, access, thrill, well-being, revenge, etc.) from her.
Let us return to Marshall & Barbaree's list of dysfunction catego-
ries to see how pornographization underlies them: (1) Life Manage-
ment Skills. Date rapists, like prison rapists, blame intoxication for
their acts. Both of their intoxications can be the result of poorly
managed, stressful, empty lives. The apparent (and material) well-
being of the date rapist can easily be a facade. (2) Communal
Skills. The date rapist's unceasing efforts at seduction are designed
to satisfy his equally unceasing need for sexual conquest, and his
doomed search for sexual fulfillment. His partner is an object, a
means toward these ends. Pornographization can only occur when it
is possible for the woman - the object - to be seen as a thing to be
consumed, and the pornographizer a consumer. (3) Relationship
Skills. The date rapist is a desirable commodity on the relationship
market. He is an attractive date. He is also a good prospect for mar-
riage because he has great potential for meeting the characteristics
of the provider. But he is over-sexed, predatory, and under-satisfied.
His good prospects do not work out well. And, of course, the
pornographizer must remain "liquid" in the flow of his "commodi-
ties." (4) Sexuality Skills. The date rapist is probably not as sexu-
ally ignorant as the prison rapist. However, he does possess the same
sense of exaggerated (and at the same time fragile) masculinity. (5)
Communication Skills. Date rapists are glib and effective communi-
cators, but like prison rapists, they do not communicate meaning-
fully with women. Indeed, they need not, because meaningful com-
munication implies communication with a Kantian subject; the
pornographizer's woman is an object. Table 1 illustrates the interre-
lationships between the disinhibitors for "normal" men, rapists' self-
explanatory accounts, and Marshall & Barbaree's categories of so-
cial dysfunction.
INCREASE IN RAPISTS' VIEW CATEGORIES OF
"NORMAL" OF SOCIAL
MALE THEIR ACT DYSFUNCTION
RESPONSE
(1) Intoxication (1) Intoxication (1) Life
Management
Skills









(4) Authoritative (7) Nice Girls (4) Sexuality









Table 1: Rape Disinhibitors, Rape Explanations, and Categories of
Social Dysfunction219
Except for the most shocking rapes and the most brutal rapists, it
is very hard to draw a line between rape and seduction which re-
sponds to our conventional assumption about what rape is. Clean-cut
219. Column one summarizes the text accompanying note 182; column two, notes
183-95; column three, notes 197-98.
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upwardly-mobile fraternity boys do not look like our image of con-
victed rapists. Yet both are unable to accurately - or even reasona-
bly - comprehend his partner's willingness to have sex. The obvious
rapes, the "traditional" ones, where one stranger overwhelms an-
other with his fists while the other fights back, are easy cases be-
cause we cannot imagine that the people we see every day will com-
mit such acts. The other rapes, equally real, but nontraditional, are
hard cases because those around us might easily commit them. The
myth of the sickness of rapists banished these other rapes from the
legal realm by denying that they really exist. The debunking of this
myth reveals these rapes and discovers that the men who commit
them are not sick - but that they have real shortcomings
nonetheless.
V. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SEXUALITY
Men, in their moments of greatest intimacy and vulnerability with
women - in their sexual relationships with wives and lovers -are
legally empowered to enforce, by means of self-help, their reasonable
expectations of sexual access. Rape - sexual contact against a wo-
man's will - occurs when male desire gets bound up with expecta-
tion. Reasonable desires - that is, natural ones - generate reasona-
ble expectations. When such a moment coincides with a moment of
sexual intimacy, a man is legally empowered to act out his desires
regardless of whether his partner shares them, or even if she acqui-
esces to them. He is entitled to proceed in these moments "willy-nilly
not caring whether [she] consents or not."220
Of course, he cannot use too much physical force to enforce his
expectations; nor can he be too inattentive to her subjective desires;
nor can he set his expectations too high relative to her relationship to
him. "Reasonableness" is a continuum, sensitive to the subtleties of
relationships. It would not be unreasonable to conclude that the right
of enforcement only applies to precisely those situations where it is
least likely to ever be used: in conventional sexual relationships
where each party desires the other. According to this interpretation
of the enforcement principle, the right of self-help is not so much an
entitlement to enforce expectations under certain circumstances as it
is a conclusion that, under such circumstances, women are generally
willing to engage in sex.
This characterization of the enforcement principle may be true.
220. Reg. v. Morgan (H.L.), [1976] App. Cas. 192, 215.
But what about women who do not want to be average or conven-
tional in their relationships with men? What happens when wives
and lovers say "No?" Unless they have husbands who will let them,
these women will have to defend their sexual autonomy with their
fists. Although men do not, in any meaningful sense, consciously re-
sort to their right of self-help in the vast majority of cases in which
the principle of enforcement applies, the mere presence of the right
has a powerful effect: it defines reality (in this instance, reasonable-
ness, naturalness, and conventionality) and, through political power
(the law of forcible rape), makes its definition come true.221
The obvious turn for this argument to take is toward false con-
sciousness: that women in these circumstances usually do subjec-
tively desire sex is the "big lie" society tells women (and tricks them
into telling themselves) to cover the exercise of male power. 222 I
want to resist making this argument, however. The idea that women
will, under these conditions of powerlessness, usually (or, naturally)
desire their partners, and therefore consent to sex, makes a mockery
of women's sexual choice and keeps the lid on a whole world of sex-
ual pain. As Robin West puts it:
The societal and institutional commitment to the notion that powerless
women naturally desire powerful men - that heterosexual desire is recipro-
cal, symmetrical and natural even though it is between concededly unequal
partners - accounts for this society's inability to "see" marital rape as
rape rather than as "bad sex." It accounts for the societal belief that
women who don't desire men are "frigid." It accounts for the social inabil-
ity to see that sexual harassment in the workplace is indeed harassment
rather than the soft "personal" touch of an office. It accounts for the social
inability to even consider the possibility that teenage pregnancy is a func-
tion of teenage male coercion rather than a breaking of "taboos" against
"natural" promiscuity. It accounts for the belief that rape victims asked for
it. It accounts for the belief that pornography causes no harm other than an
imagined and illusory offense to a Victorian sensibility. It accounts for the
221. See A. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 146-67; E. STANKO. INTIMATE INTRUSIONS:
WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE OF MALE VIOLENCE 70-82 (1985); MacKinnon, supra note 15, at
646-55.
It is this kind of power - "[p]ower to create the world from one's point of view" -
that Catherine MacKinnon argues is quintessentially the male political and social power
over women: "Combining, like any form of power, legitimation with force, male power
extends beneath the representation of reality to its construction: it makes women (as it
were) and so verifies (makes true) who woman 'are' in its view, simultaneously confirm-
ing its way of being and its vision of truth." MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method,
and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 539 (1982).
222. See K. BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY 40-46 (rev. ed. 1984); A. DWOR-
KIN, supra note I, at 122-43; M. FORTUNE, SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE UNMENTIONABLE
SIN 14-41 (1983); M. FRENCH, BEYOND POWER: ON WOMEN, MEN, AND MORALS 516-29
(1985); MacKinnon, Sexuality, Pornography, and Method: "Pleasure Under Pornogra-
phy,' 99 ETHICS 314 (1989); D. RUSSEL, THE POLITICS OF RAPE: THE VICTIM'S PERSPEC-
TIVE 267-75 (1984); Foa, What's Wrong With Rape?, in FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY 347
(M. Vetterling-Braggin, F. Elliston & J. English eds. 1977); Peterson, Coercion and
Rape: The State as a Male Protection Racket, in FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY, id., at
360; Shafer & Frye, supra note 3, at 194-95.
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belief that wolf whistles and sexual jeers on the streets are compliments
rather than assaults.
223
But the false consciousness argument also makes mockery of
women's choice. A woman can fully, freely, and authentically desire
a man who is legally empowered over her if his renunciation of legal
power is genuine. 2 But it is difficult to know, in any given case,
whether her desire is full, free, and authentic. The point is not
whether her desire is genuine and natural, or false and constructed.
The point is that women's sexual choice is deeply problematic.225
These complexities should be deeply troubling to a liberal society
(such as ours) whose avowed cornerstone of sexual ethics is bodily
autonomy and choice.226 If they are in fact not troubling, that is be-
cause they are hidden underneath the idea that powerless women
naturally desire powerful men. They will remain hidden as long as
society is willing to say that sexual inequality (historical, contingent,
situated in public life) is separate from sexual desire (natural, eter-
nal, situated in private life). But it is not ahistorically natural that
powerless women desire powerful men. We can eroticize other things
besides power and powerlessness.227
But we do not have to wait for the apocalypse (or social change of
an apocalyptic nature) to realize a more just law of forcible rape -
one that does not complicate women's sexual choice in the manner
just described. Recall how I peeled away the enforcement principle
layer by layer. The "front line" of the principle is the marital ex-
223. West, Deconstructing the CLS-FEM Split, 2 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 85, 89
(1986).
224. See Hillibaugh & Morgan, What We're Rollin' Around in Bed With: Sexual
Silences in Feminism, in POWERS OF DESIRE, supra note 15, at 394, 395; Henderson,
supra note 64, at 224-26; West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenome-
nological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 116-39 (1987).
225. This is why, I think, Adrienne Rich is careful to acknowledge that question-
ing heterosexuality as a historical, contingent, and political institution does not involve
claiming that the desire it constructs is "false." Rather, it involves recovering the truth of
the kinds of desire which heterosexuality denies or submerges (what Rich calls "lesbian
existence"), and arguing that these desires can, and do, function in the lives of women
who autonomously choose sexual desires which coincide with the constructs of heterosex-
uality (female friendship on the "lesbian continuum"). See Rich, Compulsory Hetero-
sexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 SIGNS 631 (1980).
226. See B. HARRISON, Sexuality and Social Policy, in MAKING THE CONNEC-
TIONS: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST SOCIAL ETHICS 83, 113 (Robb ed. 1985) (grounding sexual
ethics in autonomy); R. VANNOY, SEX WITHOUT LOVE: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION
52-60 (1980) (human dignity); Shafer & Frye, supra note 3, at 190-94 (personhood); see
generally Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 387 (1984) (defending autonomy for women against the modernist critique of
rights).
227. West, supra note 223, at 88-91.
emption, which strictly formalizes the right to self-help, and the con-
duct-with-accused exceptions to rape evidence rules, which enable a
man to make his reasonable expectations argument to his jury. Un-
derlying this is the construction of the rapist as a man whose expec-
tations of sexual access are unreasonable. Where a man is entitled
either to notice in the form of resistance, or an unreasonable mis-
take-of-fact defense, he will not be convicted of rape when he exer-
cises his right to self-help. Underlying the construction of the rapist
is the construction of rape. Rape occurs when expectations of sexual
access are conflated with natural, conventional desire. It is true that
if this last construct withered away, the rest would collapse (like a
house of cards); but we do not have to wait for it to do so. If we can
eliminate the higher levels of this construct (the enforcement princi-
ple in the law of rape), leaving it without its obfuscating legalistic
defenses (which make the male expectation/desire complex appear
just in application), it might die of exposure.
Imagine a law of rape with no marital exemption and no conduct-
with-accused exception to its bar on sexual history evidence. Such a
law of rape would probably include some kind of "reverse" caution-
ary instruction 228 which exhorts the jury against holding sexual
promises or expectations against the victim. Further, imagine this
law had no resistance requirement, and required that mistakes must
be reasonable if they are to serve as a defense. This law of forcible
rape is certainly logically (and I hope politically) imaginable. Under
this law a man who enforces the right to self-help - a date rapist
who exploits drunkenness, a husband who forces his wife, a boss who
uses his tacit authority, a lover who exploits vulnerability and soli-
tude - will have to argue capacity ("I couldn't help myself') or
justification ("I was entitled") directly to the jury. With the obfus-
cating layers of legal doctrine stripped away, society (through its
representatives, the jury) will have to confront the contradiction be-
tween the nature of male desire, and its (society's) aspiration of sex-
ual bodily autonomy.2 29
To change the law of forcible rape from what it now is to what I
have just imagined it to be would empower women vis-a-vis men
223. The traditional cautionary instruction in rape cases warns the jury, in effect,
the rape is easy to charge and hard to prove. This is, literally speaking, true. But the not-
so-subliminal message sent to the jury when this instruction is read is: "Be suspicious of
the victim's claims." See S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 54-55 (1987); Berger, supra note 69,
at 21-22.
229. As Lynne Henderson notes, the key to rape reform may lie more in changing
community norms than in changing legal ones, since the key disincentive to bringing rape
cases today is not as much a legal structure which bars complaints as it is a social struc-
ture which makes juries unlikely to convict in "close" cases. Henderson, supra note 64,
at 198-99. The reform strategy I suggest dovetails into Hen-derson's, in that I believe
society must confront the construction of male desire which makes rape possible in order
to change its attitudes about rape.
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(but not, I think, make women powerful and make men powerless).
It would present to society the contradiction between the construc-
tion of male sexual desire which underlies our law of forcible rape
and our sexual ethic. It might be that the result of this presentation
will be further, less subtle, oppression; that male power will take by
clear force what it attempted to steal by epistemological stealth. But
it also might be that this presentation will create the conditions for a
sexual ethic which sees that sexual powerlessness does violence to
mutuality, and that "good sex" requires genuine mutual respect.2 30
230. B. HARRISON, supra note 226, at 90.

